Author(s): Divina Rathor
Paper Details: Volume 4, Issue 5
Citation: IJLSSS 4(5) 16
Page No: 206 – 211
ABSTRACT
Alternative Investment Funds (hereinafter “AIF’s”) have been a prevalent part of India’s financial services market for over a decade now. The Securities Exchange Board of India (hereinafter “SEBI”) first came out with the SEBI (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations[1] in 2012, categorizing AIF’s as a separate class of assets similar to Private Equities and Venture Capital Funds. It described AIF’s as privately pooled investment vehicles which collect funds from investors and invest those funds in accordance with a defined investment policy[2]. Since 2012, there have been over 1900 AIF’s officially registered with SEBI[3] and commitments worth ₹15 lakh crores have been made[4]. While the industry has seen exponential growth, it has also developed its fair share of irregularities.
Several functioning AIF’s today fail to distribute the proceeds of their liquidated assets due to a number of reasons such as, a pending tax notice or an ongoing litigation. Resultantly, the AIF’s are forced to remain in operation despite exceeding their tenure. To overcome this concern, SEBI issued guidelines (hereinafter “SEBI guidelines”)[5] that allowed such AIF’s (termed as an “Inoperative Fund” by SEBI) to retain funds beyond their permissible fund life. This could be done in the event that the AIF had been served with a written communication from an authority in relation to a litigation, or in case of anticipated liabilities, the AIF may obtain the consent of seventy-five percent of the investors to retain funds beyond the prescribed period.
These guidelines unintendedly created loopholes leaving investors vulnerable to possible exploitative industry practices. This paper aims to examine the challenges of allowing AIF’s to retain funds beyond their lifetime and the possible solutions for the same.
REGULATORY BACKGROUND
The SEBI guidelines (dated June 16, 2026) permit retention of funds beyond the liquidation or dissolution period (also referred to as the funds permissible fund life), subject to one of two primary conditions. The first condition occurs in the event that an AIF receives a litigation notice which includes any official written communication from tax, regulatory, law enforcement authorities, from a court of law, or from an investor which indicate a potential tax, regulatory or legal liability. These notices include within their ambit, show-cause notices, re-assessment notices, investigations summons or any similar communications and are not restricted to crystallised demand notices[6]. The second condition arises when there is no actual notice that has been served upon the AIF, however there exists a threat of an anticipated liability that arises due to a possible/ probable litigation or tax demand. Under such a condition, the AIF would require the consent of at least seventy-five percent of the investors by value of their investment in the scheme[7]. Over and above these two conditions, the guidelines also allow the retention of a substantial amount of funds for meeting residual winding up related operational expenses[8].
In all the above described circumstances, the AIF, upon obtaining the required approval, can retain the funds invested in it beyond the permissible fund life. If intending to do so, the AIF is required to submit an application to SEBI regarding the retention of monies and upon obtaining subsequent approval from SEBI, the AIF will be tagged as an “Inoperative Fund”.
THE CORE PROBLEM
The primary and most concerning problem that arises as a result of these guidelines is the power of the majority investors to bind the minority to conditions to which they do not consent. The first condition prescribed under the SEBI guidelines, allows an AIF to retain funds upon receiving a litigation notice from the prescribed authorities. This provision is a necessity and a standard market practice within the industry. The primary concern, however, that arises from these guidelines, is with regard to the provision dealing with anticipated liabilities. The SEBI guidelines permit the retention of funds, even in the event that there is only an anticipation that they may be subject to liabilities. There are two problems with this criteria. The first is that, the SEBI guidelines fail to define what the term anticipated liabilities entails. They fail to establish a criteria that distinguishes a genuine risk from a speculative one, leaving an ominous grey area for investors.
The second concern, arises from the power vested in the hands of the majority. Under the new SEBI guidelines, the consent of seventy-five percent of the investors is sufficient to retain money within the fund. This provision inadvertently allows the AIF to bypass or simply overlook the opinion of the minority investors.
In the event that the consent is obtained, with the required assent of only seventy-five of the investors, the amount invested by the remaining twenty-five percent of investors is locked within the AIF without their consent. Consent cannot become a power exercised only by the majority. Every single member, whose consent is not obtained in this process highlights a real problem, because for that minority, their capital is being retained without their approval. No matter how small or insignificant they might seem, even the smallest minority is owed consideration. Disregarding their assent, still amounts to a breach of individual consent.
The final and yet most pressing concerns arising out of these guidelines is the lack of a prescribed time period ascribed to the retention of capital by the AIF. The SEBI guidelines provide only for a contingency in the event that the AIF’s are unable to liquidate assets and distribute proceeds to investors. It fails to adequately mention, the permissible period for which such money can be retained within the AIF. Resultantly, even if investors consent to their capital being retained by the AIF, they remain unprotected to the extent that their capital may be retained for an indefinite period of time. The problem is more severe for investors that did not willingly consent to their capital being held within the AIF. For such investors, capital is being retained within the AIF without their consent, for an indefinite period of time.
The SEBI guidelines only stipulate a prescribed period when the AIF requests for a retention of funds with respect to winding up or related operational expenses[9]. It is only then that the AIF is bound by the mandated period of three years from the end of the AIF’s permissible fund life. Otherwise, in the event of receipt of a demand notice, or on account of anticipated liabilities, there is no limit for the time which the AIF can retain funds. This ultimately leaves the investors at the mercy of the AIF. They can only hope that once the litigation is complete or the dues of the prescribed notice are paid, the AIF will liquidate the assets and advance the proceeds to the investors. However, as of today, there is no mandate on the AIF to return the capital to the investors immediately. The capital can remain locked within the AIF for years until the dispute is over, after which also the AIF is under no legal obligation to advance the proceeds to the investors.
RECOMMENDATIONS
These problems continue to perpetuate the AIF industry despite the introduction of the SEBI guidelines. In fact, pursuant to the guidelines multiple loopholes have emerged with the potential to exploit investors and create further challenges for them. These issues while pressing and concerning can be simply dealt with by introducing certain reforms and amendments to the SEBI guidelines. The first and foremost approach must be to provide a thirty day exit window for the dissenting investors. Minority investors, unwilling to allow the retention of their capital must be provided an opportunity to exit the fund at the end of its permissible fund life. For this, a thirty day window should be accounted for, wherein dissenting shareholder are permitted to withdraw from the fund. Since investors enter into the fund on their own accord they should, at the very least, be offered an opportunity to exit voluntarily, rather than be subject to will of the majority.
Another essential reform that must be incorporated within the guidelines is the inclusion of a specific time limit for the retention of funds within the AIF. Even if the AIF is permitted to retain funds upon obtaining consent from the investors themselves, they should not be entitled to do so for an indefinite period of time. As of today, investors rely solely on the goodwill of the AIF to return funds once they have been utilised for the requisite purpose. However, this alone is not sufficient safeguard for investors. There must be a statutory mandate imposed on the fund to necessarily return the capital invested within a stipulated period of time. Failure to do so by the AIF must lead to penal consequences. Further, the capital retained within the AIF must be proportionate to the amount actually required by the fund. The AIF must be required to provide an account of the amount required by it, and should accordingly retain capital within it.
Additionally, a grievance redressal mechanism must be established to provide an outlet for the concerns of the minority and/or raise objections regarding the functioning of the AIF. In the event that the fund attempts to retain money even after the settlement of the dispute or for any other impermissible purposes, the investors must be afforded the opportunity to voice their grievances. Currently the only remedy available to investors, in case of illegal retention of funds, is to escalate the matter to the courts. Needless to say this recourse is a timely, expensive and often tiresome process investors would like to avoid. Before escalating the matter to litigation, investors must be accorded the opportunity to raise the matter with a competent authority, equipped with the ability to resolve the matter effectively. Courts should be the last resort for such investors.
Lastly, steps must be taken to properly define ambiguous words within the guidelines like “anticipated liabilities”. A definitive criteria must be adopted, that would require the AIF’s to submit concrete evidence to determine whether they are liable to anticipated liabilities. The mere speculation of a liability cannot be enough to allow the retention of funds. This makes it essential for regulatory authorities to develop an objective criteria based on which AIF’s may be permitted to retain capital.
CONCLUSION
Alternative Investment Funds are a fundamental source for income growth amongst high wealth individuals. In the little time of their functioning, the challenges with the industry have become increasingly more prominent. SEBI has failed to accurately address these challenges and has, on the contrary, exposed investors to further vulnerabilities. As of today, dissenting investors are bound to the decision of the majority, without an option to exit the fund. There is no available remedy to the problem of indefinite retention of funds, which still looms large upon the investors, and key terms like “anticipated liability” remain ambiguous. The growth of the AIF industry remains stagnated without addressing these key concerns. These issues have the ability to cause serious damage to those within the industry and potentially impact economies. Thus, it is important to address these concerns and implement reforms within guidelines and at the ground level. It is only once these challenges are addressed, can the industry continue to grow as the booming industry it has always been.
[1] Securities and Exchange Board of India (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations 2012 (India).
[2] Securities and Exchange Board of India (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations 2012 (India), reg 2(1)(b).
[3] Securities and Exchange Board of India, ‘Registered Alternative Investment Funds’ (SEBI) https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebiweb/other/OtherAction.do?doRecognisedFpi=yes&intmId=16 accessed 31 July 2026.
[4] Securities and Exchange Board of India, ‘Data Relating to Activities of Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs)’ (SEBI) <https://www.sebi.gov.in/statistics/1392982252002.html> accessed 31 July 2026.
[5] Securities and Exchange Board of India, ‘Guidelines for Winding Up of AIFs with Respect to Retention of Proceeds and “Inoperative Fund” Status’ (Circular No HO/19/34/11(2)2026-AFD-POD1/I/13764/2026, 16 June 2026) https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/jun-2026/guidelines-for-winding-up-of-aifs-with-respect-to-retention-of-proceeds-and-inoperative-fund-status_102171.html accessed 3 August 2026.
[6] Securities and Exchange Board of India, ‘Guidelines for Winding Up of AIFs with Respect to Retention of Proceeds and “Inoperative Fund” Status’ (Circular No HO/19/34/11(2)2026-AFD-POD1/I/13764/2026, 16 June 2026) para 3, 3.1 https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/jun-2026/guidelines-for-winding-up-of-aifs-with-respect-to-retention-of-proceeds-and-inoperative-fund-status_102171.html accessed 3 August 2026.
[7] Securities and Exchange Board of India, ‘Guidelines for Winding Up of AIFs with Respect to Retention of Proceeds and “Inoperative Fund” Status’ (Circular No HO/19/34/11(2)2026-AFD-POD1/I/13764/2026, 16 June 2026) para 3, 3.2 https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/jun-2026/guidelines-for-winding-up-of-aifs-with-respect-to-retention-of-proceeds-and-inoperative-fund-status_102171.html accessed 3 August 2026.
[8] Securities and Exchange Board of India, ‘Guidelines for Winding Up of AIFs with Respect to Retention of Proceeds and “Inoperative Fund” Status’ (Circular No HO/19/34/11(2)2026-AFD-POD1/I/13764/2026, 16 June 2026) para 3, 3.3 https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/jun-2026/guidelines-for-winding-up-of-aifs-with-respect-to-retention-of-proceeds-and-inoperative-fund-status_102171.html accessed 3 August 2026.
[9] Securities and Exchange Board of India, ‘Guidelines for Winding Up of AIFs with Respect to Retention of Proceeds and “Inoperative Fund” Status’ (Circular No HO/19/34/11(2)2026-AFD-POD1/I/13764/2026, 16 June 2026) para 3, 3.3 https://www.sebi.gov.in/legal/circulars/jun-2026/guidelines-for-winding-up-of-aifs-with-respect-to-retention-of-proceeds-and-inoperative-fund-status_102171.html accessed 3 August 2026.
