Author(s): Shreya Paramane
Paper Details: Volume 4, Issue 4
Citation: IJLSSS 4(4) 17
Page No: 166 – 179
ABSTRACT
India’s debt recovery framework has evolved since the enactment of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (RDB Act) and the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act,2002 (SARFAESI). The RDB Act was primarily enacted to establish specialised tribunals for the adjudication of cases related to debt recovery, and later on, the SARFAESI Act was introduced to enable the creditors to enforce their security interest without judicial intervention. Landmark judgments of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. V. Union of India and Transcore v. Union of India further clarified constitutional validity and simultaneous operation of these statutes. This resulted in the dual recovery framework within India’s banking sector. However, there has been a rapid growth of digital lending platforms and fintech-based credit systems in the last decade. This development in India’s financial sector raises questions regarding the adequacy of existing legislation and recovery mechanisms, as they were mainly designed for traditional secured lending transactions. This article examines the complementary functioning of RDB and the SARFAESI Act and analyses the challenges that they face due to the emergence of digital lending models. It argues that while the dual recovery framework continues to play a crucial role in institutional debt recovery, evolving lending practices necessitate a reassessment of its effectiveness and future relevance.
INTRODUCTION
The Financial sector of India is undergoing a rapid evolution, which is characterised by the increasing growth of digital lending platforms. The emergence of digital lending and fintech-based credit systems has created a need to reanalyse the traditional debt recovery and enforcement mechanisms that govern India’s credit ecosystem. Historically, the civil courts dealt with matters related to debt recovery, but this mechanism was ineffective as it often led to delays, which severely affected banking liquidity and financial stability.[1]
In response to this inefficient mechanism, the Parliament of India introduced and enacted the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (RDB Act).[2] This act primarily established the Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRT’s), which were specialised courts for adjudication and recovery of debts for banks and financial institutions. This eventually relaxed the burden that was earlier put on civil courts by creating an entirely new and specialised mechanism for dealing with such matters. However, even the DRT mechanism gradually became overburdened. There were delays and procedural complexities that led to the pendency of the cases and eventually defeated the objective of speedy recovery.
Consequently, the Parliament enacted the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interests, 2002 (SARFAESI Act).[3] The SARFAESI Act essentially amended India’s debt recovery jurisprudence by giving power to the creditors to enforce security interests without going through court or tribunal proceedings.
The enactment of the SARFAESI Act did not replace the mechanism under the RDB Act; instead, it served as a complementary mechanism that worked simultaneously with the RDB Act. Banks and financial institutions started initiating proceedings under the SARFAESI Act while also filing applications before the Debt Recovery Tribunals under the RDB Act. Thus, the enactment of the SARFAESI Act transformed the role of the DRTs from primary debt recovery forums to supervisory bodies for reviewing the creditor’s action under the SARFAESI Act.[4]
The present emergence of digital lending and fintech-based credit ecosystems complicates the existing framework. The present recovery laws were primarily enacted for secured lending systems and tangible collateral. The modern digital credit systems are often unsecured, managed by data analytics and technologically enforced.[5] This situation fundamentally raises an important question: whether the present dual recovery laws functioning in India are structurally adequate in the emerging digital lending framework.
EVOLUTION OF DEBT RECOVERY MECHANISM IN INDIA
Before the establishment of specialised courts or tribunals for debt recovery matters, banks and financial institutions entirely relied on ordinary civil courts. This procedure led to several complex issues, eventually hampering the speedy delivery of justice. The proceedings were often delayed due to prolonged execution processes, which led to mounting pendency.[6] These issues primarily affected the efficiency and the liquidity of the banking sector in India.[7] The increasing load of non-performing assets (NPAs) further exposed the inability of the courts to speedily adjudicate matters relating to banking recovery.
The evolution of India’s modern banking recovery system must also be understood within the larger context of economic liberalisation reforms, which were initiated in the country in 1991.[8] The period of economic liberalisation marked significant transitions from a heavily regulated economy to a market-oriented financial system characterised by private participation and expansion of credit markets.[9] As economic reforms started to integrate with India’s banking sector, concern regarding financial discipline, banking efficiency and recovery of credit gained importance.
During this period of economic reforms and liberalisation, the government of India constituted the Committee on the Financial System, more widely known as the Narasimha Committee, in 1991.[10] The Committee recognised that the inefficient and delayed recovery system, combined with rising NPAs, posed a serious threat to the stability of the banking sector and the economic health of the country. The Committee recommended establishing specialised tribunals that would be dedicated to the recovery matters. [11]
Pursuant to the recommendations of the Committee, Parliament of India enacted the Recovery of Debts Act, 1933 (RDB Act).[12] This legislation established specialised tribunals known as the Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) for the adjudication of matters related to debt recovery. Under the RDB Act, the banks or the financial institutions could file Original Applications before the Debt Recovery Tribunals to seek recovery of outstanding dues.[13]
However, despite the establishment of DRTs, the recovery proceedings under the RDB Act continued to face certain challenges and delays primarily due to the infrastructural inadequacies, procedural complexities and increasing litigation. Further, the situation became even more complicated as the NPA crisis continued during the 1990’s.[14]
The Committee on Banking Sector Reforms (Narasimha Committee II), constituted in 1998, further examined the challenges faced in banking recovery and highlighted the need for strengthening creditor rights. The Committee noted that the complex adjudicatory proceedings were directly affecting the financial health of the banks and other financial institutions. Thus, the committee recommended a securitisation mechanism, asset reconstruction processes and giving powers to the creditors. Thus, the Committee highlighted the challenges faced by the creditors in lengthy judicial processes and heavily stressed on enabling secured creditors to enforce security interests without too much of court intervention.[15]
These recommendations led to the enactment of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (“SARFAESI Act”). This statute basically changed India’s recovery jurisprudence by giving power to the secured creditors to directly enforce security interests without obtaining permission from the tribunal.
The enactment of SARFAESI therefore represented a significant transition in India’s recovery framework, from a system which was mainly dependent upon adjudicatory recovery through tribunals to one increasingly centred upon direct creditor enforcement.
THE RDB FRAMEWORK AND ROLE OF DRTS
Section 3 of the RDB Act gives power to the central government to establish Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) for the matter of adjudicating claims of banks and financial institutions related to the recovery of debts.[16] Chapter IV, section 19 of the RDB Act lays down the procedure of the entire recovery mechanism.[17] Banks, financial institutions, or creditors need to file Original Applications (OAs) before the DRT to seek recovery of outstanding dues. After receiving an application from the bank, DRT sends a summons to the defendant/borrower to appear before the tribunal. The defendant gets 30 days to file a Securitisation Application (SA). After hearing both parties, the tribunal passes an interim or final order. After adjudication, the recovery officer of the DRT issues a recovery certificate.
Further, section 8 gives power to the central government to establish Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunals (DRAT).[18] The DRAT exercises jurisdiction against the orders passed by the DRT. Section 17(2) says that the Appellant Tribunal will have authority and jurisdiction over appeals made against the orders of the tribunals made under this Act.[19] Section 18 of the RDB Act outlines the jurisdiction of DRT and DRAT and says that no other court shall have jurisdiction over matters related to debt recovery and insolvency other than DRT and DRAT, except the High Court and the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 227, respectively.[20]
This framework was intended to reduce the burden on the civil courts and to improve the efficiency of the courts in the matter of recovery. However, over a period of time, DRTs were challenged with procedural delays and increasing litigations.[21]
SARFAESI AND THE SHIFT TOWARDS ENFORCEMENT
SARFAESI is a legislation that regulates the securitisation and reconstruction of financial assets and enforces the security interest of the creditors.[22] This act significantly strengthened creditor rights by giving power to the banks and financial institutions to enforce security interests without prior permission from the courts or a lengthy adjudication process.
Section 13 forms the most fundamental part of the Act. Under section 13(2), the secured creditor can issue a demand notice to the borrower when the account is classified as a non-performing asset (NPA).[23] If the borrower fails to discharge the liability within sixty days of the demand notice being served, the creditor can exercise the measure given under section 13(4). Under section 13(4), the creditor may take possession of the secured asset or take over management of the business or appoint a manager or recover amounts from third parties.[24]
Although SARFAESI is often categorised as an out-of-court recovery mechanism, the statute supervises the actions of the banks and financial institutions through sections 17 and 18. The borrowers can challenge the creditor’s action before DRT under section 17, and the appeals against the order passed by DRT will lie before the DRAT.[25]
Thus, SARFAESI does not completely eliminate the tribunals from the recovery process; rather, it postpones the adjudication until after enforcement measures are initiated.
FROM ADJUDICATORY RECOVERY TO ENFORCEMENT-BASED RECOVERY: THE CONCURRENT ROLES OF DRTS AND SARFAESI
The simultaneous function of the RDB Act and the SARFAESI Act has been shaped by judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court, through its landmark decisions, has clarified the relationship between adjudicatory recovery under the RDB Act and enforcement-based recovery under the SARFAESI framework. Two main judgements namely the Mardia Chemicals Ltd. V. Union of India[26] and Transcore v. Union of India,[27] form the jurisprudential base of India’s present debt recovery mechanism.
MARDIA CHEMICAL LTD. V. UNION OF INDIA: CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF ENFORCEMENT-BASED RECOVERY
In Mardia Chemical Ltd. V. Union of India, the constitutional validity of the SARFAESI Act was challenged under Article 32 shortly after it was enacted in 2002. The appellant argued that the legislation gave excessive and arbitrary powers to the secured creditors by permitting them to enforce security interests without taking prior judicial adjudication or permission from the tribunal. The appellant further put forth that such powers were in contradiction to the principles of natural justice and denied borrowers procedural safeguards.[28]
The challenge argued by the appellant centred around the creditor’s power under section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. Section 13 allows secured creditors, such as banks or other financial institutions, to seize, take possession of, and sell borrowers’ secured assets directly if a loan turns into an NPA without prior judicial adjudication or intervention of the tribunal.[29] The appellant contended that such an enforcement mechanism unequally favoured banks and financial institutions while undermining the rights and protections of the borrower.
While delivering the judgment, the Supreme Court of India recognised the grave economic effects posed by rising non-performing assets and the inadequacy of existing recovery mechanisms. And thus, by highlighting the parliament’s objective of ensuring speedy and timely recovery of debts and strengthening the economic and financial health of the country, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. However, the Supreme Court also stressed that the creditor’s power under the Act cannot be arbitrary and remain immune from judicial supervision.[30] Thus, through this landmark judgement, the Supreme Court attempted to balance banking efficiency and creditor’s autonomy with borrowers’ rights and procedural fairness.
Further, the Court struck down the 75% pre-deposit requirement at the initial stage under Section 17(2) of the Act. Under this section, the borrowers were required to deposit 75% of the amount that the bank is claiming before the DRT to hear their appeal. The Court ruled that such a requirement was arbitrary and illusory, as it denied borrowers a fair mechanism for grievance redressal by putting an unnecessary burden on them.[31]
Mardia Chemical Ltd. V. Union of India underlines that although the SARFAESI Act gives creditors the right to enforce their security interest without judicial intervention, these actions are not immune from judicial oversight. This judgement also established that the borrowers have a right to challenge the actions of the banks and financial institutions under the SARFAESI Act before the DRTs.[32]
Thus, this landmark judgement established the constitutional base of India’s enforcement-based recovery system while also reaffirming the rights of the borrowers and procedural fairness.
TRANSCORE V. UNION OF INDIA: RECOGNITION OF CONCURRENT REMEDIES UNDER THE RDB AND SARFAESI
The relationship between the RDB Act and SARFAESI was clarified by the Supreme Court in the case Transcore v. Union of India. This landmark judgement crucially shaped the banking sector of India by establishing that banks can simultaneously pursue debt recovery under both the RDB Act and SARFAESI. The primary challenge before the Court was whether a bank or financial institution that had already initiated the proceedings for debt recovery under the RDB Act could simultaneously get a remedy under the SARFAESI without withdrawing from the tribunal proceedings.[33]
In this case, the borrowers argued that taking simultaneous remedies under both the statutes violated the Doctrine of Election. According to the doctrine of election, a party cannot take inconsistent remedies simultaneously under more than one statute. It was challenged that once a bank starts a proceeding under the RDB framework, it could not independently proceed under SARFAESI. The borrowers contended that if a bank wants to launch actions under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, then the bank must withdraw its pending Original Application (OA) from the DRT under the RDB Act.[34]
The Supreme Court rejected the arguments of borrowers and held that the remedies under both statutes are complementary rather than mutually exclusive or different.[35] The Court further explained that withdrawing proceedings before the DRT is not a prerequisite for a bank to initiate a proceeding under SARFAESI.[36] This judgment was particularly significant as it clarified that the adjudicatory recovery mechanism and the enforcement-based recovery mechanism can coexist.
Further, the Court also discussed the two different objectives underlying both statutes. The RDB Act focused on adjudication through judicial intervention of specialised tribunals, while the SARFAESI focused on independent security interest enforcement by the banks without prior judicial intervention.[37]
The decision in Transcore therefore institutionalised India’s “dual recovery framework” and substantially strengthened creditor autonomy within the banking sector. At the same time, the judgment also contributed to the changing functional role of DRTs. Since banks increasingly began utilising SARFAESI for direct enforcement, DRTs evolved from primary recovery forums into supervisory bodies reviewing creditor action through applications under Section 17 of SARFAESI.[38]
Thus, Transcore not only clarified procedural compatibility between the two statutes but also reflected a broader jurisprudential transition from “recovery through adjudication”
to “recovery through enforcement followed by judicial review.”
EMERGENCE OF DIGITAL LENDING AND FINTECH-BASED CREDIT SYSTEMS
India’s financial sector has undergone significant developments in the past years, which have been heavily characterised by the expansion of digital lending platforms, fintech-based credit systems, and app-based financial services.[39] Technological innovations, increased smartphone use, internet accessibility and the growth of digital lending infrastructure have fuelled these developments.[40] This digital lending framework is fundamentally different from the traditional banking ecosystem.
The traditional banking system is generally dependent on physical documentation, branch-based interactions and identifiable secured assets, but the modern digital lending framework operates through software platforms based on technology, which facilitate instant and paperless credit disbursement. Unlike the traditional banking system, borrowers can now get loans through a mobile application within minutes with the help of automated verification systems and digital documentation processes.[41]
Further, the rise of fintech companies has changed the landscape of India’s credit ecosystem. Fintech companies generally operate either independently or through licensed non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) or in collaboration with financial institutions.[42] These companies use technological tools such as artificial intelligence, algorithm-based credit scoring, digital behavioural analysis and data-driven risk assessment models.[43] The instant app-based characteristic of digital lending has increased access to credit, especially for those individuals who are engaged in small businesses and were earlier excluded from the formal banking system.[44]
A very notable characteristic of modern digital lending is the increased prevalence of unsecured micro-credit and short-term consumer loans. Under the traditional lending framework, such loans often were not backed by tangible collateral or secured assets and thus were incapable of being enforced under the SARFAESI Act. Thus, the applicability of the traditional enforcement-based recovery laws is limited within the fintech lending ecosystem.[45]
Thus, the rise of digital lending highlights the structural limitations within India’s existing recovery framework and raises questions regarding whether the traditional credit ecosystem needs a new regulatory and institutional recovery model that is suited for a technology-driven lending environment.
CHALLENGES TO INDIA’S EXISTING RECOVERY ARCHITECTURE IN THE DIGITAL LENDING ERA
The simultaneous operation of the RDB and SARFAESI Act has undeniably strengthened and developed the recovery of debts mechanism in India. However, both the statutes were enacted during a time when India’s credit ecosystem was majorly characterised by the traditional banking system, institutional lending and asset-backed credit transactions. The rapid rise of the digital lending trend in India has altered the nature of lending, and several challenges within this framework have become increasingly apparent.
SARFAESI’S DEPENDENCE ON SECURED ASSETS
The SARFAESI Act is entirely dependent upon the existence of a secured asset, and this is one of the most significant limitations of the application of this statute in the digital lending context. The statute derives its effectiveness from enabling the secured creditors to enforce security interests through possession and sale of collateral without judicial intervention. Thus, the use of SARFAESI is directly linked to the presence of identifiable and enforceable security.[46]
The contemporary digital lending mechanism increasingly operates through unsecured credit. Majorly, app-based loans, consumer credit products and short-term digital loans are given to borrowers without any tangible collateral.[47] Thus, under this modern mechanism, the provisions given under SARFAESI are largely inapplicable.
This raises a challenge as SARFAESI is designed for mortgages, hypothecations and other secured credit facilities and does not apply to restricted digital lending. Thus, the question regarding the continuing applicability of this statute in a digital lending framework characterised by unsecured credit remains unanswered.
CHALLENGES TO THE APPLICABILITY OF TRADITIONAL RECOVERY MECHANISMS FOR UNSECURED FINTECH LENDING
Modern India has witnessed a growth in fintech-based lending, which has substantially transformed the credit transaction. Unlike traditional banking relationships, which involve large loan amounts and identifiable borrowers, digital lending usually involves high-volume, low-value consumer credit that spreads across a vast borrower base.[48]
The RDB framework was originally enacted to establish specialised tribunals for resolving disputes involving banks and financial institutions. It was not designed to address a large number of small-value consumer lending disputes that arise out of digital-lending.
Thus, as digital lending continues to grow, the increasing percentage of recovery disputes can fall outside the practical scope of both statutes. This situation creates an institutional gap wherein the modern lending ecosystem falls outside the existing recovery legislation. Further, this situation also underlines the question of whether the recovery jurisprudence in India has failed to develop with the growing pace of modern credit mechanisms.
EMERGENCE OF EXTRA-LEGAL RECOVERY PRACTICES
The limitations of the traditional and formal recovery mechanisms have led to the rise in extra-legal recovery practices within the credit ecosystem. Many investigations and regulatory reports have shown that there were instances where the digital lending entities or their recovery agents allegedly used coercive methods such as harassment and threats to recover the amount. Further, issues regarding the unauthorised access and use of borrowers’ personal information have also been flagged. These practices operate outside the jurisprudential framework as given under the RDB and SARFAESI Act.[49]
The emergence of such practice highlights the disconnect between the statutory recovery mechanism and the digital recovery reality. The recovery mechanism by certain digital lending entities operates through methods that are not legally recognised. This raises crucial concerns related to regulatory oversight and efficiency of the existing statutory framework in the context of the digital credit ecosystem.
BORROWER PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS CONCERNS
The SARFAESI Act allows creditors to initiate the recovery process without prior permission or intervention from the court, and the borrower can only challenge it in DRT after such an action has been undertaken by the creditor.[50] This model was enacted to address the rising NPA crisis and ensure financial stability, but its effects became more complex within the digital lending framework.
The digital lending framework is often characterised by unequal bargaining power as the borrowers usually possess less negotiating power and may lack awareness regarding the legal remedies. This creates an imbalance and raises questions regarding procedural fairness and justice within the modern credit ecosystem.
NEED FOR REFORM
The foregoing analysis suggests that while the RDB Act and the SARFAESI Act continue to constitute the cornerstone of India’s debt recovery framework, the changing nature of credit markets raises important questions regarding the continued adequacy of mechanisms originally designed for conventional secured lending transactions. The rapid growth of digital lending and fintech-based credit models appears to warrant a reassessment of certain assumptions underlying the existing recovery architecture.[51]
In particular, the increasing prevalence of unsecured digital credit may necessitate a re-evaluation of recovery mechanisms that are largely centred around the existence of secured assets. As lending practices continue to evolve, it may be worthwhile to consider whether the present framework is sufficiently equipped to address the realities of technology-driven and collateral-free credit arrangements.[52]
Similarly, the emergence of mass consumer lending through digital platforms raises questions of the adequacy of existing institutional mechanisms. Since Debt Recovery Tribunals were constituted to deal with typical banking disputes, there is some scope to examine whether the procedural framework and technological capability of these tribunals are still in sync with contemporary lending practices.[53]
Additionally, issues of borrower protection and coercive recovery practices underscore the need to strike the right balance between efficiency of recovery and procedural fairness. In this regard, more clarity in regulation and more safeguards may help to ensure that technological innovation in the financial sector does not sacrifice principles of transparency and due process.[54]
Moreover, issues like data protection, algorithmic decision-making and platform accountability are increasingly being attached to the digital lending ecosystem. The recent regulatory initiatives undertaken by the Reserve Bank of India are important developments,[55] but future legislative and policy discussions could benefit from a more comprehensive examination of these emerging concerns.
So, the problems of digital lending do not necessarily mean that the current framework has become obsolete. Rather, they suggest that the evolving nature of credit relationships may necessitate a gradual adaptation of legal and institutional frameworks. Such a strategy could help to maintain the strengths of the current dual recovery framework while ensuring it can adapt to the realities of a financial environment that is increasingly digital and technologically driven.
CONCLUSION
The RDB Act and the SARFAESI Act were important legislative steps to address the delays in recovery of debts and to improve the stability of the banking system in India. The judgment of the court, especially in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India and Transcore v. Union of India, further enabled the development of a dual recovery paradigm with the coexistence of adjudicatory and enforcement-based mechanisms.
But the surge in digital lending and fintech-driven credit has changed the nature of the lending relationship and brought to light some of the shortcomings of a regulatory regime originally conceived for traditional secured transactions. While the existing architecture remains relevant in the institutional debt recovery, the shifting credit markets raise important questions about its continued adequacy in the face of unsecured and technology-driven lending practices.
Here, the interaction between traditional recovery mechanisms and modern lending models underscores the importance of continued scrutiny of whether India’s legal and institutional framework remains equipped to respond to the realities of an increasingly digital financial ecosystem. The challenge, therefore, is not to replace the existing framework, but to ensure that it is flexible enough to respond to the demands of a shifting credit landscape.
[1] Reserve Bank of India, Report of the Committee on the Financial System 59–60 (1991)
[2] Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (India).
[3] Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, No. 54, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India).
[4] Transcore v. Union of India, (2008) 1 SCC 125 (India).
[5] Reserve Bank of India, Report of the Working Group on Digital Lending Including Lending Through Online Platforms and Mobile Apps (2021); SARFAESI Act, 2002, §§ 2(zf), 13 (India).
[6] G.S. Dubey, Debts Recovery Tribunal: A Detailed Study, 48 Chartered Accountant Practice Journal 714, 714–20 (2015).
[7] T. Tiwari et al., Report of the Committee to Examine the Legal and Other Difficulties Faced by Banks and Financial Institutions in Rehabilitation of Sick Industrial Undertakings and Suggest Remedial Measures Including Changes in the Law ¶ 8.2, at 75 (Reserve Bank of India 1984).
[8] Vijay Joshi & I.M.D. Little, India’s Economic Reforms 1991–2001 25 (1996).
[9] Id. at 109.
[10] Reserve Bank of India, Report of the Committee on the Financial System, supra note 1.
[11] Id. at 59.
[12] Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, No. 51 of 1993, Acts of Parliament (India).
[13] Id. § 19.
[14] Government of India, Report of the Committee on Banking Sector Reforms (1998); Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311, ¶¶ 30–34; Dubey, supra note 6, at 720–22.
[15] Government of India, Report of the Committee on Banking Sector Reforms (1998) (India).
[16] Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, § 3 (India).
[17] Id. § 19.
[18] Id. § 8.
[19] Id. § 17(2).
[20] Id. § 18.
[21] Dubey, supra note 1, at 714, 720.
[22] Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, No. 54, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India).
[23] SARFAESI Act § 13(2).
[24] SARFAESI Act § 13(4).
[25] SARFAESI Act §§ 17–18.
[26] Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311 (India).
[27] Transcore v. Union of India, (2008) 1 SCC 125 (India).
[28] Mardia Chemicals, (2004) 4 SCC 311.
[29] SARFAESI Act § 13.
[30] Mardia Chemicals, (2004) 4 SCC 311, 360–62 (India).
[31] Mardia Chemicals, (2004) 4 SCC 311, 362, ¶ 80 (India).
[32] Mardia Chemicals, (2004) 4 SCC 311, 346–48 (India).
[33] Transcore, (2008) 1 SCC 125 (India).
[34] Transcore, (2008) 1 SCC 125, 150–52 (India).
[35] Transcore, (2008) 1 SCC 125, 141–47 (India).
[36] Transcore, (2008) 1 SCC 125, 141–47 (India).
[37] Transcore, (2008) 1 SCC 125, 157–62 (India).
[38] Transcore, (2008) 1 SCC 125, ¶¶ 64–69 (India); Dubey, supra note 6, at 720–22.
[39] Steering Committee on Fintech Related Issues, Report of the Steering Committee on Fintech Related Issues, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, Government of India 11, 13 (2019).
[40] Id. at 11, 22.
[41] RBI Working Group on Digital Lending, supra note 5, at 20, 54, 79–80, 83.
[42] RBI Working Group on Digital Lending, supra note 5, at 103-105.
[43] Majid Bazarbash, FinTech in Financial Inclusion: Machine Learning Applications in Assessing Credit Risk, IMF Working Paper No. 19/109, at 24-29 (May 2019).
[44] Steering Committee on Fintech Related Issues, supra note 35, at 32.
[45]RBI Working Group on Digital Lending, supra note 5; Janos Barberis & Douglas W. Arner, FinTech, RegTech and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 371 (2017).
[46]SARFAESI Act § 2(zf); Mardia Chemicals, (2004) 4 SCC 311 (India), ¶¶ 30–34.
[47] RBI Working Group on Digital Lending, supra note 5.
[48] Id.
[49] Id at 85.
[50] SARFAESI Act §§ 13, 17; Mardia Chemicals, (2004) 4 SCC 311 (India), ¶¶ 45, 80–81.
[51] Reserve Bank of India, Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2024-25 50, 62, 138 (2025); RBI Working Group on Digital Lending, supra note 5.
[52] SARFAESI Act,§§ 13, 17, §§ 2(zf), 13; RBI Working Group on Digital Lending, supra note 5.
[53] Tiwari et al., supra note 7.
[54] Reserve Bank of India, supra note 22, at 85; Mardia Chemicals, (2004) 4 SCC 311, 362, ¶ 80 (India).
[55] Reserve Bank of India, Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2024–25, supra note 47, at 138.