Author(s): Rattandeep Singh, Prabhleen Singh Kalra & Ather Nazir
Paper Details: Volume 3, Issue 1
Citation: IJLSSS 3(1) 35
Page No: 335 – 345
“A Comparative and Historical Analysis of Economic Sanctions as a Geopolitical Weapon”
ABSTRACT
This research paper analyses the evolution and impact of economic sanctions and how they function as contemporary geopolitical warfare. It seeks to understand the context of sanctions, their historical relevance as well as their comparative relevance, while examining them as instruments of diplomatic coercion and economic pressure which have often led to significant humanitarian ramifications. This paper attempts to provide a clear legal description of sanctions, explaining in detail the practices of major powers, particularly the United States, and the difference between unilateral and multilateral sanctions. It is demonstrated through the analysis of numerous case studies, such as the Cold War sanctions towards the Soviet Union, the blockade of Cuba, and modern sanctions against Russia and Iran, how economic sanctions lead to widespread devastation of the economy and suffering of the people, revealing the futility of such measures for attaining political objectives. The conclusions show the necessity to develop new methods of implementing sanctions that would guarantee the protection of human life and dignity while contemplating the need to balance international security endeavours with fundamental humanitarian concerns. In effect, this study concludes that future warfare will rely more and more on economic means and therefore requires a transformation in how geopolitical strategies and policies are formulated.
Keywords: Economic sanctions, Economic warfare, Geopolitical coercion, Neocolonialism, Humanitarian impact.
INTRODUCTION
Economic sanctions are the silent weapon of modern-day warfare, which is used by governments or states to restructure global power without the need to initiate a hot war and without firing a single shot. These economic choke-holds are of diverse forms varying from imposing a high percentage of tax on necessary goods and services, trade barriers that halt commerce, financial restrictions that freeze assets, investment banks that disturb the stifle growth, export controls that cut off critical resources to technological blackouts that push nations into complete isolated scenarios. Economic sanctions are the tool of hidden diplomatic pressure and economic coercion, like a double-edged sword that penalizes human rights violations, deters military aggression and decreases nuclear ambitions. President Woodrow Wilson described economic sanctions as “something more tremendous than war,” suggesting that a nation can surrender without the need for armed conflict.[1] Historically, during the early 19th century, “The Continental System” served as a significant example of economic sanctions implemented by “Napolean Bonaparte” to weaken an adversary.[2] The establishment was made through “The Berlin Decree of 1806” and “The Milan Decree of 1807”, this system had a target to cripple the Economy of The United Kingdom by prohibiting European nations under the French influence from trading with the British but it failed due to British naval supremacy and finding alternative trade routes, One of the earliest recorder instances of successful economic sanctions happened in 1921, “League of Nations” wanted to prevent their territorial ambitions with Albania and for this Yugoslavia was threatened with potential sanctions that would cripple its economy and result was Yugoslavia withdrew their forces therefore, averting conflict.[3] Cold War period holds significant evolution during this time-span U.S. sanctioned the Soviet Union for a target that was limiting their military and economic power along with showing World dominance for this purpose the “1949 Export Control Act” restricted technology transfers, another notable instance was during 1962 the “Cuban Embargo” where President John F. Kennedy declared encompassing trade restrictions on Cuba, aiming to isolate the communist regime economically. By 1991, nearly 644 U.S. driven sanctions were imposed at the global level.[4] Post Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked a shift in the applicability of economic sanctions, making the spectrum more multilateral like they were revolutionized to deal with nuclear proliferation and human rights. In The 1990’s multiple sanctions on Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Libya were conducted by the United Nation marking the decade as “Sanctions Decade”.[5]
Powerful nations often use economic sanctions as instruments of coercion, depriving targeted states of essential resources and inflicting civilian suffering. Rather than serving as a genuine path to peace, these measures function as a modern form of economic warfare—exemplified by scenarios like The Russia-Ukrainian war. It reflects a strategy of domination that punishes nations for defying established power norms. While setting the stage for potential future reprisals when those subjugated states rise in power. Historically introduced as nonviolent deterrents to now being instruments of modern warfare, there is a need to analyse the role and dynamics of economic sanctions in modern international relations.
THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
The U.S. dominates sanctions due to its 88% share in global trade (BIS, 2022) and 58% of Forex reserves in USD (IMF, 2023). Control over SWIFT, IMF, and capital markets makes even unilateral sanctions globally binding, enforcing compliance through economic dependence.[6] The spectrum of economic sanctions is not just based upon the discretion of a state but rather validated by multiple legislatures, acts, and alliances, though the legality of those sanctions under International Law is complex and exercises an absolute dependency on the context or scenario. United Nations Charter, under Article 41) is provided to validate the security council to determine methods not involving the use of armed forces for imposing their decisions.[7] These methods can include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and other means of communication, along with the severance of diplomatic relations. This was exercised in Sanctions Against Iraq during 1990-2003. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the UN Security Council adopted “Resolution 661,” imposing comprehensive trade sanctions that restricted Iraq’s imports and exports, significantly impacting the economy. These were finally withdrawn after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The African Union (AU) uses sanctions in cases of unconstitutional changes in government or administration like the “Lome Declaration (2000)” this foundational document articulates the AU’s policy by providing measures to impose sanctions for the target to uphold democratic principles with a key instance provided could be “Guinea (2009)” when in September 2009, Guinean armed forces opened fire on protesters in Conakry, which resulted in deaths of more than 150 people and to tackle this African Union imposed sanctions on the Guinean Junta, which included ban of travelling and freezing of assets targeting the Junta’s leaders.[8] Europe also has similar frameworks as a part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which can be utilized against individuals, entities, or government at large. In 2014, the European Union imposed sanctions against Russia, including diplomatic actions and asset freezes along with travel bans and trade volumes between the EU and Russia declined.[9] This was done as a response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and the deliberate destabilization of Ukraine.[10]
The World Trade Organization (WTO) establishes a framework to ensure that trade measures, including sanctions, adhere to agreed-upon international rules. Sanctions or trade restrictions become illegal under WTO regulations when they violate these established rules without proper justification. The WTO allows economic sanctions under certain conditions but also enforces rules against unjustified trade restrictions. Article XXI of GATT provides a security exception, allowing nations to impose trade restrictions for national security reasons, but its broad interpretation leads to disputes. Notably, cases like the U.S. Helms-Burton Act (DS38) and sanctions on Myanmar (DS88/95) raised concerns about WTO compliance. The dispute settlement system has avoided ruling directly on economic sanctions, leaving ambiguity in enforcement.[11] Sanctions are categorized based on their authorization and implementation as the Unilateral “countries or regional entities may impose sanctions independently” and Multilateral “Sanctions endorsed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) carrying the legitimacy of international consensus”. A contentious aspect of unilateral sanctions is their extraterritorial reach, particularly evident in the U.S.’s secondary sanctions. These measures target not only the primary sanctioned nation but also foreign entities engaging with it, thereby extending the sanctioning country’s jurisdiction beyond its borders. They may cultivate abuse of rights if they are going against the UN Charter System or violate jus cogens norms.[12] The United States leverages its dominance over global finance through the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and the U.S. dollar, enabling it to enforce unilateral sanctions. Iraqi Banks & Iran (2024) is a key example of when the U.S. blocked Iraqi bank transactions to curb fund transfers to Iran.[13]
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS A GEOPOLITICAL WEAPON: A HISTORICAL COMPARISON
During the period of the Cold war reportedly (1948-1991), Export control and trade Sanctions were imposed on the Soviet Union aimed to create a barrier for its military & technological advancements and they were conducted by the U.S. and the Battle Act of 1951 strengthened them by requiring allies to embargo strategic goods to the Soviet Union. These sanctions resulted in mixed results because the USSR developed indigenous capabilities and chose other trade partners comparing this scenario to the modern-day aspect with 2014 recording Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Yet again the U.S. along with its Allies imposed sweeping economic sanctions involving removal of Russian banks from the SWIFT system which halted the ability to trade and global financial transaction to a certain extent resulting in constant decline in GDP growth.[14] These sanctions highlighted the weaponization of the U.S. Dollar, creating a sense of fear among other nations to switch or search for alternatives to the dollar-dominated system.[15] Another historical example was during the year (1962) “Cuba Embargo” The Cuban Revolution and their ties with the Soviet Union to tackle this U.S. imposed a comprehensive embargo on Cuba.[16] This had a simple target to isolate Cuba economically and at the Political level as well. Despite this, Cuba maintained its political standard and continued to attain support from various countries, mainly in Europe and Latin America, especially during the Cold War. This altogether can be seen as “Economic Imperialism”, where powerful countries use their economic manipulation tactics to influence, force, and control other nations. Looking through the Global lens, there are highlights about how a state is stigmatized and marginalized due to these sanctions, which completely hinders their integration on the global stage and being a part of the world economy. Economic sanctions can also be considered as a form of “Neocolonialism” [17] Which means the use of economic, political, and cultural influence to maintain control over former colonies or developing nations for example targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe since (2001) by the United States and European Union which showcased strong human rights violations and democratic backsliding this shows how the sanctions can be used as a tool to pressure the Government of Zimbabwe to limit the country’s economic sovereignty.[18]
ETHICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SANCTIONS
“Sanctions are supposed to target governments, but in reality, they hurt the people,” stated Zar Amir Ebrahimi, an Iranian Actress and Director. Her perspective highlights the humanitarian concerns associated with broad sanctions. The ethical aspect of economic sanctions is vast and complex as they can be utilized as a modern tool to stop war by using means that are non-military and they fulfil the idea of enforcing international laws or rules and penalties on countries that violate human rights for example UN declared sanctions on Apartheid-era South Africa which helped to dismantle systematic racial segregation. This sanction can also provide penalties on countries that are trying to show global aggression. These sanctions are becoming are tool of deterrence by imposing economic hardships as the present-day scenario these sanctions are becoming more of a dominating tool because sanctions have disproportionate impact on civilians rather than the ideal focus that is political elites or the mischief causing agents. the UNICEF report of (1995) on Iraq which investigated that around 500,000 children were dead because of the sanctions.[19] A recent analysis in The Times highlights the need for better-targeted sanctions to enhance their effectiveness. The article argues that poorly designed sanctions can harm unintended populations and fail to achieve desired political outcomes, underscoring the importance of precision in sanction implementation.[20] Sanctions curbed Iran’s healthcare system. Though medicines are technically exempt, financial restrictions and export-import licensing, along with difficult shipments, became a significant barrier.[21] Over 6 million patients face strong and severe consequences because of the medicine shortages. Sanctions gave rise to high mortality rates; this can be called “Silent Killing,” the reason being that it disproportionately harms the most vulnerable. Venezuela during 2013-2021 has suffered a whopping 75% GDP contraction, making it the worst economic collapse in a non-war country for around 50 years. U.S.-led sanctions slashed oil revenues and blocked essential imports, deepening hunger and spreading diseases along with migration issues. Collectively, these have transformed economic turmoil into a full-scale humanitarian catastrophe. Moreover, there are reportedly several factors for this, varying from economic mismanagement, hyperinflation, and heavy debt crisis further burdened by sinking oil production. Around 23% or 7 million of the population fled from the nation, and this is not stopping, with estimates to reach 8 million by 2025.
CASE STUDY: IRAN’S NUCLEAR DEAL & TRUMP’S WITHDRAWAL
The efficiency and effectiveness of sanctions in the scenario of Iran’s Nuclear Deal & Trump’s Withdrawal have been extensively debated and discussed. Iran advanced its nuclear program within 2 years of the withdrawal, which drastically diminished the period required to create weapon-grade fuel by half.[22] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) successfully rolled back Iran’s nuclear capabilities to a certain extent, but the “Maximum Pressure” campaign by Trump, which was re-imposing sanctions, miserably failed to achieve the desired alterations.[23] Sanctions targeted Iran’s economy, aiming to pressure the regime, but Iran evaded them, and it continued the oil exports.[24] Those Sanctions could not address Iran’s ballistic missile program, which highlighted the JCPOA’s limitations.[25] In conclusion, while sanctions exert economic pressure, their effectiveness in achieving strategic goals like curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions is limited. The Iran nuclear deal and Trump’s withdrawal underscore the complexities and limitations of sanctions as an international policy tool.
Western nations, led by the U.S. and Europe, are dominating global military, technology, and economic spheres. They prefer to use economic sanctions to influence other states without the need to create direct military conflict, but sanctions harm civilians more than the targeted elites. Sanctions do not initiate war, thus preventing collateral damage, but they do make sure that there is strong economic pressure. While they may achieve their goals, usually the humanitarian costs are at the stake. Economic sanctions are targeted to pressure regimes but this can backfire in the new world order and it is regulated by various other factors like countries are interconnected due to economic dependency or trades whereas the sanctions disturb the supply chain leading to more production cost and time-taken because of these financial markets can be seen having volatility and disrupted domestic economies. At the diplomatic level, sanctions can destroy Western moral authority and credibility on the global stage because civilians being the ones suffering the most. This majorly weakens alliances and reduces soft power influence. Additionally, sanctioned nations may turn towards other superpower nations like China and Russia, which surely challenges Western dominance. Along with this, the European Union alliance with the U.S. is nowadays under stress. for example, the EU is exploring ways to reduce dependency on external powers, particularly the U.S., in critical sectors such as energy, technology, and finance.[26] Therefore, sanctions require plenty of resources, which diverts attention and funds from other critical areas, thus affecting public trust and economic backlash.
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SANCTIONS
Economists have settled that sanctions yield substantial economic influences. These sanction effects can ascend directly through their impact on the targeted country. They can correspondingly arise circuitously through shared sanctions aimed back at the prime sanctioned, as well as through third-party realms. We now contemplate each of these three chief thespians in turn. The impact of sanctions on target states has been the main focus of the majority of the empirical work on sanctions. Scholars have employed a range of econometric techniques and various datasets to measure these effects. The relevant literature has produced four broad conclusions. 4 First, how sanctions affect different target states, economic agents (individuals and businesses), sectors, and particular behaviours have been detrimental and substantial. Second, the overall performance of the sanctioned states—including trade, foreign direct investment, growth, poverty, and political stability—has been severely harmed by economic sanctions. Third, sanctions have a lasting impact on growth, commerce, foreign direct investment, and economic development that frequently lasts even after they are removed. Fourth, depending on the type of sanctions (trade vs financial restrictions, for instance, or complete versus partial sanctions), as well as whether they are applied unilaterally or multilaterally, the results might vary greatly. Sanctions (US versus UN), as well as the particulars of each instance. Therefore, the existence of highly significant heterogeneity is frequently hidden by models that apply common sentencing effects across the many sanction aspects previously mentioned. Sanctioned nations frequently take steps to counteract the negative effects of sanctions by rerouting international trade and investment flows toward third countries, “shielding” specific economic actors—typically large corporations deemed “vital” to national interests—forming alliances with “friendly” third countries, and, as was the case with Russia in 2022, retaliating against their sanctions. Based on official records, it might be challenging to determine whether some punishments are retaliatory. However, according to a review of the Global Sanctions Data Base, the number of punitive penalties is few and are frequently best understood as symbolic declarations. From a methodological standpoint, many studies that attempt to calculate the effect of sanctions on target states encounter endogeneity issues in the sense that the economic effects we observe may be influenced by the same events that lead to the sanctioning of target countries, such as civil or interstate conflicts or human rights violations. Surprisingly, this problem has been largely ignored in the existing research. Recent outliers include Kwon, Syropoulos, and Yotov (2022a) and Gutmann, Neuenkirch, and Neumeier (2020). These studies have tackled the problem of endogeneity by leveraging certain aspects of penalties, such as by taking into account adaptable tools on legislation and regulations in punishing governments that are regardless of what occurs in jurisdictions that have been sanctioned. Future research on the consequences of sanctions must acknowledge the endogeneity issue and address it head-on, either using current techniques or developing fresh approaches. The impact of economic sanctions on senders has not attracted much attention from academics thus far, possibly because this impact is typically minimal. The fact that most sanctioning governments’ economies are significantly larger than those of the targeted states, which tends to erode bilateral economic dependency, could be one reason for the seeming lack of interest. Furthermore, senders can typically redirect economic activity toward third, non-sanctioned states when they face the danger of reciprocal countersanctions. Furthermore, senders have the option to create and/or enforce sanctions to reduce, or at the at least, the potential negative effects on their constituents. One such example is the current sanctions on Russia, which some nations have chosen not to enforce, and others did not completely implement the punishments they had declared. Senders’ attempts to cut their expenses cast serious doubt on the legitimacy, efficacy, and implementation of their sanctions policies (Lektzian and Sprecher 2007). Even while senders are willing and able to reduce the detrimental effects of sanctions on their economies, current quantitative evaluations offer some proof that these effects do exist because of the markedly reduced. The exchange of money between senders and recipients (Besedeš, Goldbach, and Nitsch 2021). However, for several reasons, such as the heightened economic ties between sanctioning and no sanctioned nations (commonly referred to as “trade divergence”), the disparity in size between the main sanctions and targeted states, and the potential reversal of some sender nations within a sanctioning coalition, these effects do not translate into a meaningful impact on senders. Accordingly, new data indicates that punishments often have a minor and transient effect on sender states, which is in line with previous research (e.g., Farmer 2000). But this does not always mean that the expenses. If the targets are strong and economically significant, the number of fines imposed on senders would be small. Despite the sanctions’ modest effect on senders, we see some encouraging avenues for further research in this field. First, from a methodological standpoint, a fundamental component of theoretical models on sanctions should be the ability of senders to choose the best combination of sanction tools and to create sanctions in a way that maximizes the economic harm to targets while reducing the cost to the senders. The idea that senders might impose “fake” sanctions in response to political declarations meant to conceal their financial intentions is a second avenue that might be worthwhile to investigate both theoretically and empirically. Therefore, punishments may be imposed to benefit the sender rather than fulfil the stated political goals of the sanctions. The idea that penalties could be imposed to further the objectives of particular interest groups is also supported by this scenario (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2007). Third, members of senders’ coalitions may bear an unfair share of the cost of sanctions. This raises the possibility of implementing trustworthy redistribution mechanisms in sender coalitions to share the cost of penalties, which could lead to advancements in the formulation, application, and efficacy of multilateral sanctions. We define “extraterritorial” (or “secondary”) sanctions broadly as penalties on individuals, companies, organizations, and other entities from no sanctioned countries due to their engagement in activities like trade, investment, or other business The US’s threats and actions against German corporations participating in the development of the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline, which runs from Russia, are notable recent examples of such sanctions. Both policy reports and the popular press have discussed extraterritorial sanctions and their consequences.[27] No sanctioned nations, which frequently see these activities as “forced and/or “illegal,” are directly harmed by these effects, according to a wealth of anecdotal data (Meyer 2009; European Commission 2021). Even though policy analysts and the media have focused on the extraterritorial effects of sanctions, there isn’t much scholarly research on the subject. Additionally, the majority of current research is descriptive and provides scant qualitative support. For the extraterritorial sanction effects (Gordon 2016). Several recent theoretical and quantitative studies offer evidence that extraterritorial sanctions cause significant additional economic damage to targeted countries, thereby contributing to the political success of sanctions (Han 2021; Kwon, Syropoulos, and Yotov 2022b).[28] However, given the significance of extraterritorial sanctions for effective policymaking and their function as a key factor in determining the success of sanctions, more effort is required to quantify their effects (Early 2021). Economists have generally concluded that targets may experience notable, predictable, and frequently protracted repercussions from economic penalties. Because of our innate understanding of sanctions procedures, we may anticipate sanctions to be a powerful tool for policy. However, political scientists have largely not come to that conclusion.
CONCLUSION
The thorough analysis of economic sanctions depicts there is an urgent need to establish a strong international framework that assures fair and ethically compliant policies. The present-day system is largely regulated by Western nations, which often cause disproportionate harm to civilians and fail to achieve the desired political outcomes. For example, a UNICEF report of 1995 on Iraq revealed that around 500,000 children died due to sanctions, underscoring the humanitarian crisis that can arise from broad economic restrictions. To deal with this, sanctions must have a framework that safeguards human rights and inculcates multilateral consensus with constant monitoring and analysis. The future of warfare is drastically shifting towards economy-based battles rather than conventional military engagement. The challenge stays intact, which is establishing the need to balance the strategic goals of sanctions and protect vulnerable populations with a target to maintain international peace and cooperation.
[1] Mulder, N. (2022, May 20). The Economic Weapon: How sanctions became a tool of modern war. Big Think. https://bigthink.com/the-past/economic-sanctions-weapon-war/
[2] Continental System | Definition, History, & Facts | Britannica https://www.britannica.com/event/Continental-System
[3] Taylor, A. (2021, December 1). 13 times that economic sanctions really worked. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/04/28/13-times-that-economic-sanctions-really-worked/decade
[4] Cilizoglu, M., & Early, B. (2021, April 26). Researching Modern Economic Sanctions. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies. Retrieved 10 Mar. 2025, from https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-599
[5] U.S. sanctions, peacemaking and Reform | Crisis Group. (n.d.). https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/us-sanctions-peacemaking-and-reform
[6] https://www.nber.org/papers/w31024
[7] United Nations. (n.d.). Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression (Articles 39-51) | United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7
[8] Webmaster. (2009, November 7). Daily Trust. Daily Trust. https://dailytrust.com/african-union-imposes-sanctions-on-guinea-junta/
[9] Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Sinabell, F., Hinz, J., Fritz, O., & Christen, E. (2017). Russia’s and the EU’s sanctions : economic and trade effects, compliance and the way forward, Publications Office. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/658339
[10] EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine. (n.d.). EEAS. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/30963_en
[11] https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Alan-Yanovich-Presentation-1Oct2014.pdf
[12] https://sanctionsplatform.ohchr.org/record/4756
[13] https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/iraq-banks-u-s-fed-iran-financing-0c3e740c
[14] https://www.americanforeignrelations.com/E-N/Embargoes-and-Sanctions-Cold-war-sanctions.html
[15] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/dollar-still-dominatesn
[16] https://www.wola.org/analysis/understanding-failure-of-us-cuba-embargo/
[17] https://www.eurasiareview.com/16012018-neocolonialism-and-the-myth-of-state-sovereignty-oped/
[18] https://www.zimfa.gov.zw/index.php/component/k2/item/49-impact-on-zimbabwe-and-the-region-of-the-unilateral-sanctions-imposed-by-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-european-union
[19] https://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/01/world/iraq-sanctions-kill-children-un-reports.html
[20] https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/better-targeting-is-needed-for-russian-sanctions-to-be-effective-cspwx7jzx
[21] Gorji A. (2014). Sanctions against Iran: The Impact on Health Services. Iranian journal of public health, 43(3), 381–382.
[22] https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/08/iran-advances-nuclear-program-withdrawal-jcpoa/
[23] https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-06/focus/trumps-failing-iran-policy
[24] https://www.jpost.com/international/article-843640
[25] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/10/the-trump-administration-and-the-iran-nuclear-deal-analysis-of-noncompliance-claims?lang=en
[26] https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/europe-will-struggle-slip-us-economic-chokehold-2025-03-05/
[27] In the popular media, “secondary sanctions” are often used as a synonym for “extraterritorial sanctions.” However, there are important differences between these terms: “secondary” sanctions are aimed at entities that are not directly related to the sanctioning states, while “extraterritorial” sanctions are aimed at entities that are affiliated with the sanctioners but operate in nonsanctioned countries. In practice, the line between these terms is often blurred. To simplify exposition, we use the term “extraterritorial” sanctions in a broad sense to include sanctions on sender entities that operate abroad as well as sanctions on nonsender entities.
[28] Economic Sanctions: Evolution, Consequences, and Challenges, T. Clifton Morgan, Constantinos Syropoulos, Yoto V. Yotov, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 37, no. 1, Winter 2023, (pp. 3–30)