Navigating the Judicial Labyrinth: A Critical Analysis of High Court Judges’ Transfers and Appointments

Author(s): Sampada Awadhwal

Paper Details: Volume 3, Issue 1

Citation: IJLSSS 3(1) 44

Page No: 433 – 446

ABSTRACT

This article examines the constitutional provisions and current procedures for the transfer of judges in India, alongside landmark judgments that have shaped the judicial appointment and transfer process. The discussion spans the First, Second, and Third Judges Cases, the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act of 2014, and the evolving discourse around what could be termed the ‘Fourth Judge’s Case.’ A critical analysis of Justice V.K. Tahilramani’s transfer elucidates the parameters considered for transferring a judge. The article also delves into the recent Victoria Gowri case, presenting analysis and suggestions for reform.

The need for transparency in the transfer procedure is highlighted, addressing the issue of procedural opacity and asymmetry, with a comparative look at the judicial appointment systems in the United States and South Africa. The analysis underscores the necessity for a system of checks and balances to safeguard judicial independence and integrity.

INTRODUCTION

 The intricate process of transferring and appointing High Court judges in India stands at the intersection of judicial independence, constitutional principles, and administrative efficiency. This complex system, often likened to a labyrinth, has been the subject of intense scrutiny, debate, and legal reform over the years. The mechanisms governing these crucial decisions not only shape the judiciary’s composition but also significantly influence public trust in the legal system.

At its core, this topic addresses the delicate balance between maintaining the judiciary’s autonomy and ensuring accountability in its highest echelons. The mechanisms governing these crucial decisions not only shape the judiciary’s composition but also significantly influence public trust in the legal system. This critical analysis aims to unravel the intricacies of these procedures, examining the historical context, legal frameworks, and contemporary challenges that define the transfer and appointment of High Court judges.

Our exploration delves into the judicial scrutiny of appointments and the vital role of checks and balances, using South Africa’s system as a comparative model. The South African approach offers valuable lessons on how judicial oversight can be effectively integrated into the appointment process, potentially informing reforms in other jurisdictions.

 Simultaneously, article address the pressing need for transparency and the problem of asymmetry in judicial appointments, drawing insights from the U.S. system. The American experience highlights the challenges and benefits of a more open appointment process, providing a contrast to systems with less public visibility.

By examining these international models alongside India’s own evolving practices, the article seeks to provide a comprehensive view of the challenges and potential solutions in judicial appointments and transfers. This comparative approach allows us to explore how different systems balance transparency with confidentiality, manage the role of the executive vis-à-vis the judiciary, and address issues of asymmetry in information and power.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND CURRENT PROCEDURE OF TRANSFER

The Indian Constitution enables the transfer of High Court judges, including Chief Justices, between different High Courts. While the President has the authority to make these transfers, the process requires mandatory consultation with the Chief Justice of India (CJI). The judge being transferred does not need to consent to either their first or subsequent transfers.[1]

The CJI’s opinion carries decisive weight in this process. When considering a judge’s transfer, the CJI must evaluate feedback from both the Chief Justice of the current High Court and the Chief Justice of the proposed High Court. Additionally, a collegium consisting of the CJI and the four most senior Supreme Court judges reviews written opinions on the proposed transfer.

The government plays a role through consultation. Following the collegium’s recommendation, the Law Minister reviews it and advises the Prime Minister, who then makes a recommendation to the President. Once the President approves the transfer, it becomes official through a gazette notification, and the judge assumes their position in the new High Court.[2]

2. LANDMARK JUDGMENTS: PIVOTAL JURISPRUDENCE SHAPING JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESSES

2.1 FIRST JUDGE’S CASE[3]

The landmark S.P Gupta case addressed judicial independence and procedures for judge appointments and transfers. One key issue before the court concerned the legitimacy of Central Government orders that prevented the appointment of two specific judges.

In a close 4:3 decision, the Supreme Court determined that the union government, rather than the Chief Justice of India (CJI), should have primary authority in constitutional matters regarding judicial appointments. The court affirmed the interpretation of consultation as defined in Articles 124(2) and 217 of the Constitution.

The ruling established that while the CJI must be consulted for High Court judge transfers, these transfers couldn’t be used as punitive measures and needed to serve public interest. However, the court clarified that the CJI’s role in this consultation process was advisory rather than binding. To promote balance between governmental authority and citizens’ rights, the court mandated that the CJI must consult with at least two senior Supreme Court judges before making transfer-related decisions. This framework was designed to maintain judicial independence while establishing clear procedural guidelines.

In cases involving judge transfers, the CJI is required to consider input from both the Chief Justice of the transferring High Court and the Chief Justice of the receiving High Court.

2.2 UPHOLDING CONSTITUTIONAL ETHOS: THE SECOND JUDGES’ CASE[4]

In  a nine-judge bench overruled the S.P. Gupta verdict with a 7:2 majority, establishing the Collegium System for judicial appointments and transfers in higher courts. The court clarified that the term “consultation” in the Constitution reinforced, rather than diminished, the Chief Justice of India’s (CJI) pivotal role, granting the CJI significant authority in judicial appointments and transfers. This landmark ruling reduced executive interference, reinforcing judicial independence and adhering to Article 50 of the Constitution, which promotes the separation of powers. By limiting political influence and personal biases, the decision aimed to ensure a merit-based, transparent judicial selection process.

Collegium System – By ruling that the Chief Justice of India’s opinion would be conclusive in deciding the issue when there is a disagreement between the President and the Chief Justice of India on the appointment of judges, the Court reversed the first judge’s case. “The Chief Justice’s authority to uphold the check and balance system shall be governed by the collegium system, the court further decided. To ensure that the judiciary has the ultimate say in all matters pertaining to appointments to the Supreme Court and High Court, the Chief Justice of India will only make a judgement after speaking with the two senior Supreme Court justices regarding the appointments to the Supreme Court. The High Court Justices are subject to the same circumstances”. Spirit behind the law – Whoever does not understand the spirit of the law is said to not understand the law. So, a convention that truly embraces the spirit of a constitution rather than just the text of it is truer to the constitution. In accordance with the spirit of the Constitution, the government has upheld the custom of basing judicial nominations on the counsel of the Chief Justice of India and other constitutional authorities, with the former taking precedence in the event of a disagreement. It is inconceivable that it would go against this norm and, in turn, the fundamental principles of the Constitution[5].

2.3 COLLEGIUM EXPANSION

The collegium system for Supreme Court appointments was expanded to include five members following the President’s recommendation. This expanded collegium consists of the Chief Justice of India along with the four most senior Supreme Court justices, replacing the earlier smaller committee. In a significant ruling[6], nine Supreme Court justices endorsed this five-member collegium system over the previously suggested three-judge format.

The Court also redefined the meaning of “consultation with the Chief Justice of India” as mentioned in Articles 217(1) and 222. According to this interpretation, when the Constitution refers to consulting the Chief Justice, it actually means obtaining agreement from a majority of judges in the collegium, rather than just the Chief Justice acting alone[7].

2.4 BALANCING ADMINISTRATIVE POWER BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIARY

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN HANDS OF EXECUTIVE – 99TH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ACT 2014 – INSERTION OF ARTICLE 124 A[8] – NATIONAL JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS COMMISSION

“The commission will be headed by

• The Chief Justice of India,
• The two most senior Supreme Court judges
• Two eminent people (to be nominated by a committee consisting of the Chief Justice of India, Prime Minister of India, and the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha or the leader of the single largest opposition party in the House where there is no such Leader of Opposition)
• One of the two eminent individuals would come from a minority group such as the SC/ST/OBC or be a woman. The distinguished individuals are nominated for a three-year term and are not eligible for re-nomination.”

“A National Judicial Commission was established for the appointment of judges, according to the Justice Venkatachaliah Commission’s 2002 report, which was commissioned by the NDA. The NJAC Act was subsequently approved by the Indian President, Pranab Mukherjee, on December 31, 2014, after the Indian Government enacted it through a Constitutional Amendment in August 2014.”[9]

“Procedure for selecting Supreme Court judges and High Court judges under the NJAC Act 2014

• For Supreme Court appointments, the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) was tasked with recommending the most senior Supreme Court judge deemed capable for the Chief Justice of India position. For other Supreme Court judge positions, the NJAC would evaluate candidates based on their qualifications, merit, and other specified criteria outlined in the regulations.
• Regarding High Court appointments, the selection of a Chief Justice was to be based primarily on seniority among High Court judges, along with considerations of capability, merit, and other regulatory requirements. For regular High Court judge appointments, the process involved the NJAC first forwarding potential candidates to the relevant High Court’s Chief Justice. The Chief Justice would then consult with their two most senior colleagues and, when necessary, with other judges and legal counsel. Additionally, the selection process incorporated input from both the state’s Governor and Chief Minister. Throughout this process, the NJAC remained the primary body responsible for finalizing judicial appointment recommendations.
• The President’s authority to request reconsideration – The President might examine the NJAC’s proposals more closely. The NJAC’s unanimous recommendation must be followed by the President when choosing the candidate after giving it some thought.
• Critical Analysis of NJAC Foundational Criticisms – The NJAC’s rejection stemmed from fundamental concerns about judicial independence. Its composition, allowing executive influence through the Law Minister and appointed eminent persons, threatened constitutional principles. The veto power granted to any two members could effectively block appointments, while the absence of judicial primacy in decision-making violated the basic structure doctrine and separation of powers.”

2.5 SAFEGUARDING JUDICIAL AUTONOMY: A CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE

The Fourth Judges Case[10], arose from multiple petitions challenging the constitutionality of the 99th Constitutional Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act. The key issue was whether these laws were consistent with constitutional principles.

By a 4:1 majority, the Supreme Court declared the NJAC Act and the 99th Amendment unconstitutional. The court held that the executive’s involvement in judicial appointments violated the separation of powers, undermining judicial independence. It ruled that including the Union Law Minister in the NJAC compromised the judiciary’s autonomy, increasing the risk of political interference and reciprocal influence.

The court noted that the representation of the Chief Justice of India (CJI) and the two senior-most judges in the NJAC was inadequate to maintain the judiciary’s supremacy in appointments. Consequently, judicial independence—a cornerstone of the Constitution—was jeopardized. The decision emphasized that although reforms were needed to enhance transparency and accountability in the Collegium System, it remained essential for preserving judicial independence. Thus, the collegium system was retained as the primary mechanism for appointing judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts[11].

3. AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1 SCRUTINIZING JUDICIAL TRANSFER CRITERIA: THE TAHILRAMANI PRECEDENT

Case Study: Karnataka HC Chief Justice V.K. Tahilramani.

• The supreme court can order the transfer of judges for improving the functioning of high court, or public interest for better administration of justice
• If there are close relative of judge functioning of either of the high courts
• Or if judge has litigation or property interest in the state or has become controversial so the continuance in the high court is not conducive[12].

“Chief Justice Tahilramani was the then most senior judge among the country’s High Court judges, the sudden proposal to move her to the Meghalaya High Court raised some concerns. She presided over the Bombay High Court as acting Chief Justice before being named Chief Judge of the Madras High Court. The Madras and Bombay High Courts are two of the largest High Courts in the country, whereas the Meghalaya High Court is only authorised to have three justices, including the Chief Justice. Days after the Supreme Court Collegium recommended that VK Tahilramani, Chief Judge of the Madras High Court, be transferred to the Meghalaya High Court, she made the decision to offer her resignation[13]. A resolution for her transfer was first passed on August 28, in the interest of better administration of justice.”

The transfer’s ability to advance Tamil Nadu’s citizens’ interests in the administration of justice is the crucial question at hand. The Supreme Court must first take care of its own affairs before it can serve as a sentinel of justice. Its functions, both judicial and administrative, ought to be transparent and responsible. Judges have already ruled that executive orders issued without cause were unlawful. The same ought to hold true for the collegium of the supreme court’s administrative decisions.

Rumors about Justice Tahilramani’s transfer are widespread on social media and in the hallways as a result of the confusing facts surrounding it. Some have also theorized that the move was caused by the personal prejudices of several Supreme Court judges. It would be nice to think that these rumours are untrue.

3.2 CASE STUDY VICTORIA GOWRI’S CASE

Justice Lekshmana Chandra Victoria Gowri’s appointment to the Madras High Court faced considerable controversy due to allegations of delivering hate speeches against religious minorities. Despite these concerns, the Supreme Court dismissed petitions challenging her elevation, emphasizing that the collegium’s recommendation followed a consultative process. Justice Gowri took her oath as an additional judge in February 2023. In 2024, the Supreme Court collegium, led by Chief Justice DY Chandrachud, recommended Justice Gowri and four others for permanent judgeship at the Madras High Court. The collegium assessed their judgments and consulted with a judge familiar with the Madras High Court’s affairs, concluding that all nominees were suitable for permanent positions. This decision was supported by the Chief Minister and Governor of Tamil Nadu. These developments highlight ongoing debates about transparency and political influence in judicial appointments in India.

3.3 ADV. SAURABH KIRPAL’S APPOINTMENT: A CASE REFLECTING LACK OF JUDICIAL DIVERSITY

The ongoing delay in the appointment of Saurabh Kirpal, a senior advocate and India’s first openly gay nominee for the Delhi High Court, has underscored critical issues in judicial appointments, including inclusivity, independence, and systemic biases. Despite being recommended by the Supreme Court Collegium in 2017, Kirpal’s elevation has not been finalized, as the government has repeatedly raised objections, citing concerns about his personal life and relationships.

The controversy centers on the government’s objections based on Kirpal’s long-term relationship with a Swiss national, who serves as a diplomat. The government has argued that his partner’s foreign nationality poses a potential “security risk.” However, many critics see this as a guise for discrimination, especially given Kirpal’s openness about his sexuality. The Supreme Court Collegium, in its 2023 reiteration, dismissed the government’s objections as irrelevant and reaffirmed its recommendation, emphasizing that neither Kirpal’s sexual orientation nor his partner’s nationality diminishes his competence or integrity.

This delay has brought to light significant systemic issues within India’s judicial appointment process. The controversy has reignited debates about the lack of transparency in the collegium system and the potential for executive overreach. Critics argue that by withholding Kirpal’s appointment, the government is undermining the judiciary’s independence and its constitutional obligation to uphold equality and non-discrimination.

Kirpal’s case also highlights the broader issue of diversity within India’s judiciary, which remains largely unrepresentative of marginalized groups, including the LGBTQ+ community. His appointment would mark a historic milestone for inclusivity and would reflect a judiciary more aligned with the progressive judgments it has delivered, such as the decriminalization of homosexuality in the 2018 Navtej Singh Johar case.

As of now, Kirpal’s appointment remains in limbo, symbolizing both the challenges of achieving true inclusivity in India’s judicial system and the resilience of those advocating for a more equitable judiciary. His elevation, if it happens, would not only set a precedent for LGBTQ+ representation but also reinforce the judiciary’s commitment to constitutional principles of equality and justice.

4.1 THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY AND THE PROBLEM OF ASYMMETRY: INSIGHTS FROM THE U.S. SYSTEM

The collegium system in India can be contrasted with judicial nomination processes in democracies such as the United States, South Africa, and Kenya, which emphasize transparency. In these countries, the selection process is public from the outset. For instance, in the U.S., the President nominates federal judges, and the Senate holds public confirmation hearings where candidates’ qualifications and judicial records are thoroughly examined[14].

PROCEDURE

1. Nomination by the President:
   1. The President of the United States nominates candidates for federal judicial positions, including Supreme Court Justices.
   1. The selection process is informed by recommendations from the Department of Justice, the White House Counsel, and other advisors.
   1. The President often considers factors such as legal expertise, judicial philosophy, and diversity when making nominations.
2. Senate Judiciary Committee Review:
   1. The nominee is vetted by the Senate Judiciary Committee, which holds public hearings to evaluate the candidate’s qualifications, judicial philosophy, and background.
   1. During the hearings, the nominee is questioned by committee members, and external stakeholders, including legal experts and advocacy groups, may provide testimony.
   1. The committee then votes on whether to recommend the nominee to the full Senate.
3. Senate Confirmation:
   1. The full Senate votes on the nominee. A simple majority is required for confirmation.
   1. The process is public, and senators often debate the nominee’s qualifications and judicial philosophy before voting.
4. State-Level Appointments:
   1. The process for appointing state judges varies by state. Some states use elections, while others use appointment systems similar to the federal model or merit-based systems involving judicial nominating commissions.

The judicial appointment process in the United States emphasizes checks and balances by involving both the executive and legislative branches, ensuring that no single branch dominates[15]. The public nature of Senate hearings fosters transparency, allowing for thorough scrutiny of nominees’ qualifications and judicial philosophy, while Senate confirmation provides accountability through democratic oversight. However, the process is not without flaws; it often becomes highly politicized, with nominees evaluated based on perceived political leanings rather than legal expertise, and partisan gridlock in the Senate can lead to delays or blockages in confirmations[16]. In contrast, India’s Collegium System operates with significant opacity, as the identities of judicial candidates are disclosed only after the Collegium finalizes its recommendations. Decisions are made behind closed doors, often relying on Intelligence Bureau reports, which grants the government considerable influence. This lack of transparency can result in uneven power dynamics, exemplified by the government’s use of a pocket veto—such as in the case of Madras High Court appointments—where recommendations are delayed or blocked despite Collegium approval. This closed process undermines accountability and raises concerns about favoritism and undue influence.

4.2 JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF APPOINTMENTS AND THE NECESSITY OF CHECKS AND BALANCES: AN EXAMINATION OF SOUTH AFRICA’S SYSTEM

The second issue is closely tied to the first: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?—Who will guard the guardians? Once the collegium, comprising the three or five senior-most Supreme Court justices, makes a recommendation, the only way to challenge it is through the judicial system. However, this raises concerns since the challenge would be heard by their junior colleagues, who are assigned cases by the Chief Justice of India (CJI)—the head of the collegium. This creates a conflict, as judges must effectively rule on decisions made by their superiors.

While the collegium is technically an administrative body and its decisions are subject to judicial review, in practice, asking judges to evaluate the actions of their senior colleagues introduces significant challenges. During reviews, judges focus on whether the candidate meets the eligibility criteria rather than debating their suitability, assuming that issues like prior controversial statements (e.g., alleged hate speech) were thoroughly considered during the selection process.

In contrast, South Africa provides a more transparent model. Judicial appointment processes are subject to scrutiny, and courts have mandated the public disclosure of commission deliberations. In South Africa, the appointment of judges is governed by a structured and transparent process designed to ensure judicial independence while promoting accountability. The Judicial Service Commission (JSC) plays a central role in this process[17].

PROCEDURE

1. Composition of the JSC
   1. The JSC is a diverse body comprising:
      1. Judges, including the Chief Justice and the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal.
      1. Representatives from the legal profession.
      1. Members of Parliament.
      1. Academics and other stakeholders.
   1. This composition ensures that multiple perspectives are considered in the selection process.
2. Selection Process:
   1. The JSC interviews candidates for judicial positions in public hearings, which are often broadcast live.
   1. Candidates are evaluated based on their legal expertise, integrity, and commitment to constitutional values.
   1. The JSC makes recommendations to the President of South Africa, who is constitutionally bound to follow these recommendations. In rare cases, the President may request reconsideration, but the JSC’s final decision is binding.
3. Transparency and Accountability:

The public nature of the interviews ensures that the process is transparent and open to scrutiny. South African courts have mandated the disclosure of JSC deliberations, further enhancing accountability.This system allows for errors to be identified and corrected through independent oversight, as the judiciary is not solely responsible for its own appointments. While not flawless, this system of checks and balances ensures greater transparency and accountability by separating the judiciary from the appointment process. Such separation allows for error correction through independent oversight. In India, this level of correction is difficult because the collegium, the CJI’s office, and the Supreme Court—responsible for judicial review—are inherently interconnected, making impartial oversight nearly impossible.

CONCLUSION

The transfer and appointment of High Court judges in India sit at the core of the judiciary’s independence and the democratic framework established by the Constitution. This document has explored the evolution of judicial appointments through landmark judgments, the challenges faced by the collegium system, and the controversies surrounding recent cases like Justice V.K. Tahilramani’s transfer and Justice Victoria Gowri’s appointment.

While the collegium system was designed to protect judicial independence by reducing executive interference, its opaque nature has led to calls for greater transparency and accountability. Comparative insights from judicial systems in the United States and South Africa highlight how a balance between transparency and judicial independence can be achieved through checks and balances.

The need for reform is clear. A more transparent, accountable process that preserves judicial independence while maintaining public trust is essential. Establishing a more open selection procedure, perhaps by incorporating elements of public scrutiny or independent oversight, could strengthen the judiciary’s integrity and ensure its impartiality in upholding the rule of law. Moving forward, India’s judicial system must embrace reforms that enhance both the efficiency and fairness of judicial appointments, ensuring that the judiciary remains a robust pillar of democracy.

REFERENCES

CASES

1. India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth, AIR 1977 SC 2279 : (1977) 4 SCC 98
2. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp.S.C.C. 87; A.I.R. 1982
3. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (1993)
4. The Supreme Court of India (IN RE: APPOINTMENT & TRANSFER OF JUDGES) v. Civil Advisory Jurisdiction (1998)
5. IN RE: APPOINTMENT & TRANSFER OF JUDGES) v. Civil Advisory Jurisdiction AIR 1999 SC 1
6. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015), AIR 2015 SC 5457

BOOKS

• Jain, M. P. (2014). Indian constitutional law (7th ed.). Jasti Chelameswar & D. S. Naidu (Eds.). LexisNexis.
• Singh, M. P. (2008). V. N. Shukla’s Constitution of India (11th ed.). Eastern Book Company.

ARTICLES & JOURNALS

• Deshpande, V. S. (1985). High court judges: Appointment and transfer. Journal of the Indian Law Institute, 27(2), 179–197. Indian Law Institute.
• Noorani, A. G. (1976). Transfer of high court judges. Economic and Political Weekly, 11(19), 685, 687–688. Economic and Political Weekly.
• Mathew, A., Vaigai, R., & Devika, S. (2019, September 9). Justice Tahilramani: An arbitrary transfer, a graceful resignation. The Hindu.
• Sivakumar, R. (2023, February 6). Victoria Gowri unfit to be Madras High Court judge: Lawyers write to Prez. The Indian Express.
• The saga of appointing Justice Victoria Gowri. (2023, February). Frontline.

REPORTS & INSTITUTIONAL PUBLICATIONS

• American Bar Association. (n.d.). Judicial selection in the United States: An overview.
• Brennan Center for Justice. (2016, June 6). Judicial selection for the 21st century.
• Harvard Law School. (2012, July 1). Elected vs. appointed? The history of judicial selection in the U.S.
• Ballotpedia. (n.d.). Methods of judicial selection in the states.
• Gibson, J. L., & Nelson, M. J. (2016). How state judicial selection methods may influence views of U.S. Supreme Court nominees. Journal of Law and Courts. Cambridge University Press.

---

[1] India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth AIR 1977 SC 2279 : (1977) 4 SCC 98

[2]  Art.222 of the Constitution of India

[3] S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp.S.C.C. 87; A.I.R. 1982

[4] Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (1993),

[5] V.S. Deshpande,  “HIGH COURT JUDGES: APPOINTMENT AND TRANSFER.” Journal of the Indian Law Institute, vol. 27, no. 2, 1985, pp. 179–97. JSTOR, . Accessed 10 Mar. 2023.

[6] The Supreme Court of India (IN RE: APPOINTMENT & TRANSFER OF JUDGES) v. Civil Advisory Jurisdiction (1998)

[7] IN RE: APPOINTMENT & TRANSFER OF JUDGES) v. Civil Advisory Jurisdiction AIR 1999 SC 1

[8] Article 124A  Constitution of India 1949

[9] Constitution (Ninety-Ninth Amendment) Act, 2014

[10] Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015)

[11] Supreme Court Advocates-on-record Association v. Union of India AIR 2015 SC 5457

[12] S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp.S.C.C. 87; A.I.R. 1982

[13] ANNA MATHEw, R. VAIGAI, S. DEVIKA – ”Justice Tahilramani: An arbitrary transfer, a graceful resignation”, THE HINDU, September 09, 2019

[14] Harvard Law School. (2012, July 1). Elected vs. appointed? The history of judicial selection in the U.S

[15] Gibson, J. L., & Nelson, M. J. (2016). How state judicial selection methods may influence views of U.S. Supreme Court nominees. Journal of Law and Courts. Cambridge University Press

[16] American Bar Association. (n.d.). Judicial selection in the United States: An overview.

[17] Constitution of South Africa, Section 174: Governs the appointment of judges.

Judicial Service Commission Act, Act 9 of 1994: Establishes the JSC and its functions.