Author(s): Gehna Vats
Paper Details: Volume 3, Issue 3
Citation: IJLSSS 3(3) 26
Page No: 352 – 362
INTRODUCTION
The endeavour of statutory interpretation, at its very core, is the how courts interact with the law. It is the link between the written laws and the actual reality, where instead of plain or neutral phrases, words start to take on meaning, setting and effect. In the interpretative realm, the judges turn an observer and logician, and rules or maxims are not technical equations but useful instruments for navigation. Noscitur a sociis or its more organised variation, ejusdem generis, are examples of subsidiary rules that have a special position among the various aids of interpretation. Such regulations aim to control vagueness by adding structure to statutory language, especially when general terms follow specific words.[1]
However, these guidelines are not automatically applied. Every time they are used, their use must be supported by the legal backdrop, legislative intent and language structure. Invoking ejusdem generis requires the existence of a recognizable genus, which is an underlying link that binds the specific phrases which precedes general words. In absence of such genus, the rule’s application bears the danger of obscuring rather than elucidating the legislative object. This procedure of interpretation reflects a larger change in legal ideology that prioritises uniformity over structure, purpose over tradition and content over formalities.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ISSUE:
The Essential Commodities act of 1955[2], a law passed to guarantee the fair distribution and accessibility of necessities, created the regulatory framework that gave rise to the case of Hamdard Dawakhna vs UOI[3]. In order to regulate the quality and composition of fruit-based beverages in India, the Central Government issued the Fruits Products Order, 1955[4], in accordance with its authority under Section 3 of the Act.[5]
The dispute was regarding Clause 2(d)(v) of the Order[6] which defined “fruit products” to include: “squashes, crushes, cordials, barley water, barreled juice and ready-to-serve beverages or any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp”. All producers whose goods were included in the category required by the Ministry (acting through the appropriate authorities), to meet a minimum requirement – particularly, that their products had to consist of at least 25% fruit juice.
The producer of the popular Unani beverage “Rooh Afza”, Hamdard Dawakhana, challenged this categorization. Despite having certain fruit-based ingredients, they argued that their goods did not belong to the category of beverages stated before the general clause and were not meant to be ingested as a fruit juice. They contended that “any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp” ought to be construed ejusdem generis, or in view of the specific words that come before it, like “squashes, crushes and cordials”, which they claimed compromised a particular category of fruit drinks that were flavoured, processed and diluted.
This brought up the main legal query: Can ejusdem generis rule be applied to the listed beverage that come before “any other beverages containing fruit juices or fruit pulp”?
The petitioners argued that their item should be exempted since it is neither made up for straight up drinking nor falls under the particular criteria that forms a cohesive genus of “syrup, diluted, or flavoured fruit-based beverages meant for immediate consumption”. The state countered that the last umbrella phrase should not be arbitrarily limited and that the provision was purposefully worded in a wider manner to cover a variety of beverages.
The Supreme Court’s broader exploration of bounds of ejusdem generis and the likelihood of abuse in situations when no distinct class exists was made possible by this factual and legal dilemma. The court’s reasoning went into the question of conventional use of this canon, making a substantial contribution to the growth of Indian interpretative jurisprudence.
JUDGEMENT
The Fruit Products Order, 1955’s Clause 2(d)(v)[7] presented an interpretative problem, and the Supreme Court categorically ruled that ejusdem generis criterion could not be applied. The Court underlines that the absence of this subsidiary rule must be predicated on the existence of a recognizable genus, which is an essential link among the particular words that precede the generic terms. It concluded that the list of “squashes, crushes, …. ready-to-serve beverages” was not uniform enough in this instance for the rule to be applicable.
When the Court examined the nature and intent of the listed items, it found that there were significant differences in their methods of preparation, way of consumption and intended function. For instance, squashes and crushes are concentrated syrups that need to be diluted, cordials cans be anything from medicinal drinks to flavouring beverages (with or without alcohol), readymade drinks for direct consumption, and barley water (grain based) and only sometimes contains fruit. Crucially, they were not logically connected by any common characteristic or class. The Court determined that any effort to put ejusdem generis to use would be legally incorrect, considering the lack of a “defined category or class”. Trying to create a broad category like “non-alcoholic beverages” or “refreshments” would be a mistake because these phrases are too ambiguous to fulfil the rule’s limited intent. Uncertain categories cannot serve as the foundation of a canon that requires accuracy.
The Court adopted a purposive methodology, going above the linguistic articulation, highlighting the order’s objective. According to the Court, the main goal was to assure the quality and uniformity across all fruit-based products rather than to establish strict beverage taxonomy. Producers would be able to get around legal obligations by marketing similar items that theoretically fall outside the textual classification if the provision is interpreted narrowly. As a result, the Court argued that the comprehension of statute must be guided by its policy goals and larger context of the legislation, particularly when it comes to acts designed under welfare-centric laws like Essential Commodities Act, 1955[8]. By declining to establish specific boundaries for “any other beverages” the Court chose to move away from strict blackletter doctrine.
UNDERSTANDING THE RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS
The subsidiary rule of interpretation – Ejusdem generis, Latin term for “of the same kind or nature”, is applied whenever a list of specific words is followed by generic terms. It states that the general term is assumed to be limited on the same category or class as the preceding specialised terms. As G.P. Singh notes, it is “a rule of reason rather than of law”[9]. The goal is to prevent inadvertent overbreadth in implementation while giving legislative language significant meaning. For example, the term “other vehicles” would normally refer only to motorized road transport, omitting boats and airplanes in case a legislation prohibits “cars, trucks, buses and other vehicles.” The characteristics of the special words are passed down to the general ones in this situation.
CONDITIONS FOR APPLICABILITY
Four prerequisites for the application of ejusdem generis have been delineated by legal academics.[10] These include:
- A list of specific words: the statute must have a list of two or three specific items. In certain situations, two can be enough, but courts usually require a pattern.
- Same class or nature: the particular words must be homogeneous – a part of a well-known and widespread genus or category, such as different kinds of equipment, vehicles, or animals.
- General word follows: to activate this canon, the general phrase must come after the specific words. The must be followed by catch-all expression like “other”, “etc.” or “otherwise”.
- No contrary intent: There must be no indication that the statutory scheme intends to expand its reach. Ejusdem generis is superseded if legislative intent manifestly favours an expansive interpretation.
The rule will not apply if these requirements are not met, for as when there is not a distinct class or when the goal of the act obviously calls for a broad construction.
Let’s say that “dogs, cats, rabbits, and other animals” are forbidden in public parks by a municipal regulation. In this instance, ejusdem generis would imply that “other animals” should be understood to refer to comparable tiny household pets rather than larger or wild creatures like cows, elephants etc. On the other hand, if a consumer protection legislation forbids the deceptive promotion of “medicines, cosmetics, home appliances and other products”, these are not of the same kind as they relate to health, beauty and household respectively. The rule should not be used to limit the definition of “other products” because no distinct genus is revealed. Further, a legislation taxing “wine, beer, spirits and other beverages”, could lead to a discussion about whether the category is limited to alcoholic beverages or includes non-alcoholic drinks like soda. Thus, for such a borderline application, the statute’s overarching goal – general taxation vs public health regulation would determine the response.
Thus, the Court gave the law’s practical purpose in its socioeconomic setting top priority. When considering this idea from the perspective of modern beverage innovation, it becomes much more persuasive. Examine if goods like protein shakes, vitamin water, kombucha, cold-pressed juices, flavour-infused sparkling water would fit into the list provided into the list under Clause 2(2)(v) of the Act.[11] Such innovative drinks muddle the distinctions between juice-based preparation, supplements, health drinks and carbonated drinks, even though they frequently include fruit components. Such items would be excluded by a strict application of ejusdem generis, creating a huge legislative vacuum, emphasising the need for purposive thinking in order to maintain the integrity of the statute and to keep the law current/adaptable to changing consumer demand and production methods.
CASE COMMENTARY
The Hamdard Dawakhana v. UOI[12] case, a milestone judgement by the Supreme Court of India took a purposive approach after facing a provision calling for applying the ejusdem generis rule. This also questioned the possibility of a genus, the boundaries of formalism and the need for changing of statutory coherence in a regulatory welfare – oriented scheme.
WAS THE GENUS TRULY ABSENT?
The Court’s assertion of lack of “definable genus” is debatable, since all the drinks, regardless of their variations are non-alcoholic, usually fruit-based or flavour-infused and appropriate for direct or diluted consumption.
Based on G.P. Singh’s approach to the rule as a “rule of reason” and not a strict formula, a reasonable genus might have been defined on the lines of “non-alcoholic fruit-flavoured drinks sold for oral hydration[13].” The functional, commercial, and consumer-oriented similarities between such products might have enabled a controlled and sensible genus to be deduced—especially if interpretive flexibility were used with the requisite judicial restraint.
WAS THE COURT TOO DISMISSIVE OF CLASSIFICATION?
An overly cautious approach by rejecting any possibilities of a coherent class was approached by the court. Legislative drafting often employs illustrative lists followed by general terms to accommodate future developments. By not further exploring the internal consistency of the clause, the Court might have rejected too readily a structure that might have been harmonised with a more specific drink categorisation systems, such as those used in modern food regulatory law like the FSSAI’s.
Based on Vepa Sarathi’s interpretation of ejusdem generis, legislative economy often demands this technique, which consists of providing concrete illustrations prior to the use of a general expression[14]. The structure of the clause would have had potential for interpretation if this context had been overlooked.
Nevertheless, Paul Armstrong argues in ‘The Conflict of Interpretations’ that popular rationality, rather than determinism, needs to be the goal in resolving meaning conflicts. On this line of thinking, legal coherence was preserved instead of covered up by the Court’s refusal to enjoin the rule[15].
ALTERNATIVELY, A PROGRESSIVE MOVE TOWARD PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION?
The decision highlights a wider judicial trend in welfare laws by reflecting a move towards purposivism, concentrating on quality oversight and consumer protection under the Order instead of a strict contextual construction.
This evolution is effectively captured by Arie’s Rosen’s “correctness oriented” method of legal interpretation maintains that interpretative faithfulness resides in a comprehensive harmony with goals, principles and institutional commitments of the law, rather than in mindless conformity to linguistic canons.[16] According to this perspective, the judges are proactively developing legal meaning which encompasses the underlying logic of the law as well as its public reasoning instead of just deciphering the words.
THEORETICAL TWIST: DWORKIN’S CHAIN NOVEL THEORY
A good framework for understanding how the Court interprets is the “chain novel” analogy developed by Ronald Dworkin[17]. Each judge writes a chapter to a multi-author book under Dworkin’s theory and their duty is to ensure that the succeeding chapter is consistent with the values and principles of the old chapters. The Court established a rational extension of legislative and judicial intent by construing Clause 2(d)(v)[18] as part of an overall commitment to public health and regulatory integrity.
This approach reflects the Ronald Dworkin’s concept of “constructive interpretation”. He asserts that “coherence in principle is necessary for the integrity of law”.[19] This implies that judges ought to interpret legislation in a way that makes them ethically consistent with the larger legal system rather than simply treating them as inflexible texts. This view is echoed by Court’s focus on substantive legislative intentions and reluctance to limit the interpretation to the parameters of literal wording. The ruling makes it evident that ejusdem generis or other subsidiary rules are contingent instruments rather than unchangeable doctrines and should only be applied when doing so furthers and not impedes legislative intent. It showed a functionalist and progressive approach to legal interpretation by firmly establishing its reasoning in intent, context, and policy by eschewing formalized canons.
BREYER’S PURPOSIVE LENS AND JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY
The argument in this instance is most like Justice Stephen Breyer’s purposivist framework. In the Breyer-Scalia debate, Breyer argues that the judges particularly in cases where the language is broader, should look at the intention of the legislation and the broader societal implications. The Court also does the same, assigning the public welfare objectives of the statute priority over formalist consistency.
Breyer’s model[20] recognizes that the strict application of the interpretive canons can yield results that can frustrate a law’s functional purpose. Justice Scalia’s textualism, by contrast, would have probably preferred stricter application of ejusdem generis, confining “any other beverages” to those closely like the listed ones in chemical or preparation terms. However, textual literalism poses a threat to both practical flexibility and moral coherence, as argued by Dworkin and Rosen.
SHOULD EJUSDEM GENERIS BEND?
Ejusdem generis is still a guiding maxim and not an inflexible command. Especially in areas like food safety and consumer protection, the courts must ensure that restrictive interpretative defaults do not make regulatory acts meaningless[21]. Generalized language in such acts is applied precisely to anticipate innovation and prevent circumvention.
The Court was right to recognise that outdated beverage classifications cannot be used to restrict public interest regulation. That does not mean that ejusdem generis must be dropped. Where applications would compromise the public interest, regulatory integrity, and legislative intent, the rule must be flexible in such cases.
CRITIQUE USING SCALIA-STYLE TEXTUALISM:
What if the Supreme Court had adopted a more textualist and conservatism stance in Hamdard Dawakhana vs UOI?[22] Based on a linguistic, literalist interpretation of the Act (written in the vein of Justice Scalia) would support a rigorous utilisation of ejusdem generis. In order to avoid the urge to alter the scope of the statutes to achieve the assumed legislative goals, the dissent judge would maintain that judicial understanding should remain rooted in the exact wording of law. A dissent would claim that the clause in contention features an obvious semantic structure i.e. a list of particular items followed by a general term and invoked the conventional trigger for ejusdem generis.
According to this criterion, the generic term must only be understood to refer to items that are similar to those preceding it. Observing that cordials, squashes and crushes all have the same characteristics, the dissent would define a commonality or genus as “sweet, syrup-based, alcohol-free, fruit flavoured cocktails manufactured for oral intake.” Although the genus is operationally and economically consistent, it may not be same chemically or nutrient-wise. Then, “Rooh Afza” would potentially be included in the genus, but the dissent would argue that the general clause should not be permitted to apply to products that deviate too much from this classification, like grain based or protein shakes.
Scalia would have cited that “the text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed.” The ruling would indicate that courts lack the authority to enact laws from the bench by incorporating inferred legislative goals into explicit statutory language. The judges should only decide what the law says and not if it is the best option. Foreseeability and the ideals of the supremacy of law are both emphasised by this perspective. This provides firms with a precise, understandable rule preventing judicial overreach.
CLAUSE REFORM AND THE IMPERATIVE OF LEGAL PRECISION
A well-crafted statute accomplishes more than mere bypassing the judicial checks, it positively obliterates vagueness by giving objective standards, a transparent framework and is flexible enough to accommodate the constantly changing situations. The confusion around Clause 2(d)(v) of the Fruit Products Order, 1955[23] was not really about what it was trying to achieve – it was more about how it was worded. It stuck to outmoded product classifications that were out of date rather than utilizing precise and useful definitions. These kinds of clauses must abandon conventional labels and concentrate on precise, useful, and quantifiable requirements in order to avoid future mistakes of this kind.[24]
The modern clause can adopt a straightforward standard of requiring at least 25% fruit juice or pulp to confer fruit product designation on beverages instead of providing detailed lists of products. A legally valid revision of the clause should read as follows: – “Any beverage containing minimum 25% fruit juice components or fruit pulp by volume will qualify as a ‘fruit product’, regardless of how it was made, how it was meant to be used, how it was stored, or how it was packaged.” A very similar pragmatic approach can be found in the position of the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI).[25] The classification method arranges beverages through functional parameters which focus on fruit content specifications and production techniques with general use guidelines rather than traditional labelling methods. Shopfront launches like kombucha, cold-pressed juices and fruit-infused water have benefitted from this draft flexibility as it enabled their automatic inclusion rather than updating rules every time something new comes up on the store shelves.
Stumpff’s fractal theory of law supports such draughting practices that deliver straightforward useful results because minor mistakes in draughting can produce unexpected complex issues.[26]The precise interpretation of laws depends on legal language having coherence as it ensures that laws remain effective according to their original purpose.
Welfare legislation such as the Essential Commodities Act of 1955[27] makes the need for clear and comprehensive draughting even more necessary. The use of precise language throughout regulations provides regulators and judges the authority and needed strength to defend consumer rights adequately. The practice of creating effective laws means establishing future directives with present problem solutions. As shown by Rooh Afza’s legal scenario any legal interpretation should evolve from the fundamental law objectives instead of dissolving into old-fashioned vocabulary and vague language overload.[28]
BROADER IMPACT ON STAUTORY INTERPRETATION
The Court’s rejection of the ejusdem generis rule, established that a statute’s grammatical form should not dictate its interpretation when it undermines legislative intent. This precedent is impactful in welfare legislation, where the objectives of the society at large precedence.
This approach has fostered a dynamic interpretive framework in Indian courts, encouraging judges to consider legislative purpose and societal context. For instance, in Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa[29], the Court expansively interpreted the term, “industry” under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947[30], to extend labour protections, mirroring Hamdard Dawakhana’s emphasis on public welfare and similarly, in Siddeshwari Cotton Mills v. UOI[31], the term “any other process” was limited to processes imparting lasting fabric changes, reflecting the genus of preceding terms. By clarifying that ejusdem generis should not be applied mechanically when it leads to absurdity or defeats legislative goals, Hamdard Dawakhana bridges textual tools and societal purpose, promoting a functional judiciary.
CONCLUSION
Hamdard Dawakhana stands as a landmark decision in Indian jurisprudence, highlighting that statutory interpretation must align with legislative intent and societal needs. By advocating against the blind application of ejusdem generis, it promotes a refined approach that prioritizes public welfare. The case portrays law as a living instrument, that can adapt to contemporary challenges and has created a judiciary that is favourable to the goals of society. The evolution toward purposive interpretation is a positive development, ensuring laws remain effective, though maintaining predictability is crucial. In our opinion, this shift reflects a progressive judiciary that balances justice with legal stability, reinforcing the law’s role in serving society.
[1] Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes, 5th ed. (2010)
[2] The Essential Commodities Act 1955 (India).
[3] Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1965 SC 1167.
[4] Fruit Products Order 1955 (issued under s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955)
[5] The Essential Commodities Act 1955 (India).
[6] Fruit Products Order 1955, cl 2(d)(v)
[7] Fruit Products Order 1955, cl 2(d)(v)
[8] The Essential Commodities Act 1955 (India).
[9] G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (15th edn, LexisNexis 2022) 371–386.
[10] Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes (5th edn, Eastern Book Company 2010) 109–113.
[11] The Essential Commodities Act 1955 (India).
[12] Hamdard Dawakhana v Union of India AIR 1965 SC 1167.
[13] G P Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (15th edn, LexisNexis 2022) 580.
[14] Vepa P Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes (5th edn, Eastern Book Company 2010) 131–132.
[15] Paul B Armstrong, ‘The Conflict of Interpretations and the Limits of Pluralism’ (1983) 98(3) PMLA 341, 343–345.
[16] Arie Rosen, “Statutory Interpretation and the Many Virtues of Legislation,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2017), pp. 134–162
[17] Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986) ch 5.
[18] Fruit Products Order 1955, cl 2(d)(v), issued under s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955.
[19] Ronald Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’ (1982) 9 Critical Inquiry 179.
[20] Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer, A Conversation on the Constitution: Perspectives on the Role of Judges (15 May 2012) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_4n8gOUzZ8I accessed 15 April 2025.
[21] William N Eskridge Jr and Philip P Frickey, ‘Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning’ (1990) Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series 205.
[22] Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1965 SC 1167.
[23] Fruit Products Order 1955, cl 2(d)(v), issued under s 3 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955.
[24] Fruit Products Order 1955, cl 2(d)(v); Hamdard Dawakhana v Union of India AIR 1960 SC 554.
[25] Food Safety and Standards (Food Products Standards and Food Additives) Regulations 2011 (India) reg 2.3.6.
[26] Richard Stumpff, ‘The Law is a Fractal: The Attempt to Anticipate Everything’ (2007) 44 University of San Francisco Law Review 777
[27] Essential Commodities Act 1955, s 3.
[28] Arie Rosen, ‘Statutory Interpretation and the Rule of Law: The Paradox of Correct Application’ (2014) 90 Notre Dame Law Review 159.
[29] Bangalore Water Supply v A Rajappa (1978) 2 213 (SCC)
[30] The Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (India).
[31] Siddeshwari Cotton Mills v Union of India (1989) 2 458 (SCC)