Author(s): Shimasaan Gbanger
Paper Details: Volume 3, Issue 3
Citation: IJLSSS 3(3) 24
Page No: 336 – 347
ABSTRACT
Nigeria has witnessed several regimes of oil subsidy removal since 1986. Following this trend, President Bola Tinubu removed oil subsidy during his inauguration in May 2023. The objectives of the removal now and in the previous regimes are/were centred on the need to reduce expenditure on subsidy and make better use of the funds realised. This research investigated the legal implication of the oil subsidy removal on energy security during these regimes. Using the doctrinal research method, the research found that oil subsidy removal occasioned damning energy security issues during those regimes. It was similarly found that even the objectives of the oil subsidy removal were not met. This was usually because the existing issues of energy security were not properly considered before such removal. It was therefore concluded that at the moment, as always, Nigeria is not well prepared for oil subsidy removal. It was recommended among other things that government should reverse the present oil subsidy removal, examine the existing challenges such as absence of local refineries and endemic correction, and remedy them before gradually removing oil subsidy.
INTRODUCTION
The Nigerian government institutionalised oil subsidy in 1977 in order to reduce oil prices for Nigerians. With continued importation of refined oil, the burden of subsidy has increased steadily and has resulted in government expenditure. The country has therefore attempted to remove oil subsidy severally in order to invest the monies recovered in better projects, the latest being the removal by President Tinubu in 2023. However, the removal of oil subsidy has presented further challenges to energy security in Nigeria. This research considers oil subsidy removal, the existing issues of energy security and the effect which the removal of oil subsidy has on energy security at the moment.
MEANING OF SUBSIDY AND OIL SUBSIDY
Generally, subsidy has been defined as the process of aiding or promoting a particular undertaking by providing financial support for such undertaking.[1] According to Jewell and others, subsidy entails any government intervention aimed at reducing the actual market price of oil in order that the final user will purchase it at a lower price.[2] This aligns with the position by Uzonwanne and others who define subsidy as ‘any measure that keeps prices for a good or product below market level for consumers or producers.’[3]
The underlying difference in the definition by Jewell and others and that by Uzonwanne and others lies in the inclusion of producers. That is to say, oil subsidies may be include interventions which reduce the actual purchase price or actual production cost. For the consumers, this may be done by reducing the purchase price and government’s payment for some part of the cost while for the producer, government may provide grants, tax reliefs or tax exemptions.[4] Subsidy of any item may come in many ways but the underlying objective is usually to relieve the cost which a person would have been made to pay for that particular item. Lawal explains this in the following words;
It may be an assistance paid by government to a business or an entire economic sector or producers of goods and services to offset part of their production costs. It could be in form of government subventions given to a producer that experiences continuous unprofitable operations, but are of strategic importance to the nation. It could be in the form of financial assistance given to farmers, healthcare providers, ailing factories and many others that are of strategic importance to the government. It may be by way of; tax allowance, duty rebate, tax holiday, tax moratorium, tax exemptions, grant, or soft loan that is designed to maintain; desired prices of essential products, incomes of producers of critical or strategic products or employment levels or induce investments to reduce unemployment. Subsidy can also come as indirect financial contribution by a firm to its employees’ welfare in the form of low costs of; meals, accommodation, medicals, insurance or transportation.[5]
OIL SUBSIDY AND REMOVAL REGIMES IN NIGERIA
The enactment of the Price Control Act (then promulgated as a Decree in 1977) marked the institutionalisation of oil subsidy and subsidy on other products in Nigeria.[6] Paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the First Schedule to the 1977 Act provided for the controlled prices of kerosene, petrol, diesel oil and fuel oil respectively. This was aimed at cushioning the effect of the inflation which affected countries and citizens on a global scale.[7] Less than ten years thereafter however, there was a shift in the regime of subsidy (oil and other products). This was in 1986 when President Ibrahim Babangida partially removed subsidies leading to the increase of petrol prices to 39 kobo per litre from the initial 20 kobo per litre.[8] The partial removal followed Babangida’s implementation of the Structural Adjustment Program which was expected improve the economic outcomes for Nigeria.[9]
The program failed woefully and so did the objectives of subsidy removal as well as other policies connected to the Structural Adjustment Program.[10] The World Bank stated later on that the Structural Adjustment Program did not work because the root cause of Nigeria’s problem remained unsolved.[11] It stated that Nigeria could do little or nothing in the face of its vicious public expenditure, high poverty levels, depreciation of the exchange rate and inflation.[12] Thus, it was said that Nigeria needed effective measures to be adopted by public and private sectors aimed at stabilizing the economy, ensuring proper use of its resources and providing basic public facilities.[13] Other regimes following Babangida’s regime allowed the existence of oil subsidy.[14] However, increase in prices of oil continued steadily through several regimes including Abacha and Obasanjo’s regimes.[15] In 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan removed oil subsidy and instituted the Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Program (SUREP) which also failed to yield positive results.[16]
ENERGY SECURITY
Energy security refers to the continuous availability, affordability and accessibility of energy resources.[17] The two concepts of availability and affordability invariably bring to fore the concept of sustainability. Thus, where energy resources are available at all times and at affordable prices, sustainability will be maintained in the long run. Availability is driven by either investment by public institutions or government or by private individuals or ventures.[18] These investments are dependent on the ability of government policies to attract local and foreign investments.
Affordability is also dictated by the market structure and the pricing policy especially where the price is regulated. Where the availability and affordability dimensions of energy security are properly handled, accessibility and sustainability become imminent and bears positive effects on the future. Amiesa and others opine that ‘the sustainability dimension entails the regulation of energy resources exploitation and consumption, to ensure that energy resource is also preserved for the future generation.’[19]
In the absence of uninterrupted availability and affordability however, achieving sustainability and accessibility becomes difficult. In such instance, energy security remains a concept only to be desired. Akabuiro and Umeobika opine that: ‘energy security entails the availability of energy resources that are diverse, sustainable in quantities, affordable in prices, supports economic growth, assists in poverty alleviation measures, does not harm the environment and that takes note of shocks and disruptions.’[20]
This appears to be a more comprehensive approach to the definition of energy security. It must however be noted that asides the very important mention of the need to protect the environment, it is in line with the definition offered by Amiesa and others in all other aspects. That is to say, the continuous availability and affordability of energy resources which necessarily ensure sustainability/accessibility, economic growth and poverty alleviation.
From all the above, it is noticed that the concept of energy security, if promoted will build and sustain efficiency in all sectors of the economy. This is because almost every sector of the economy depends directly or indirectly on the energy sector. This is why it is important to take this energy security seriously if development, growth and security are to be maintained.
EXISTING CHALLENGES OF ENERGY SECURITY
The necessity of discussing the existing challenges of energy security in Nigeria lies in the fact that, as can be seen later in this work, all the existing issues affecting energy security are compounded or made worse at every regime of removal of oil subsidy. The discussion on the legal impact of oil subsidy removal exemplifies this just as the brief discussion on oil subsidy removal regimes above. Thus, the broad issues of energy security are discussed to provide a better perspective of how oil subsidy removal further disturbs even the existing challenges.
In Nigeria, various factors are responsible for energy insecurity. According to Oyedepo,[21] these factors include policy issues, corruption and infrastructural deficiency. Akabuiro and Umeobika also opine that the issue of energy security in Nigeria covers the disruption in supply of energy, availability of energy resources and their affordability, the volatility of price of crude oil and sustainability.[22] To them, considering the rich energy resources with which Nigeria is blessed, there is no excuse for lack of energy security. In this research, energy security issues such as policy issues, corruption, availability and affordability are now discussed.
POLICY ISSUES
Policy issues in relation to energy connote decisions made by government or its agencies in the energy sector. For the purpose of this research as can be seen later, this may extend to all government practices whether stated publicly or not which affects energy security in one way or another. Government policies constitute all or most of the decisions made in the energy sector. This is because the ownership and control of the most lucrative energy resources such as oil and gas rests with the state or government.[23] By section 1 of the Petroleum Industry Act 2021 (the PIA), ‘[t]he property and ownership of petroleum within Nigeria and its territorial waters, continental shelf and exclusive economic zones is vested in the Government of the Federation of Nigeria.’ The PIA also vests in the Minister of Petroleum the power to oversee the affairs of the petroleum industry. This includes the power to ‘formulate, monitor and administer government policy in the petroleum industry.’[24] These provisions are a few out of the numerous provisions giving control of the petroleum industry including policy formulation to the government.
Ogundari[25] posits that because of its dominance the government of Nigeria has the responsibility to ensure energy security. That is, put the necessary infrastructure in place, maintain it and ensure the availability, affordability and accessibility of energy resources to the general public. Thus, any failures or in inadequacies in the energy sector must be attributed to the government.[26]
However, there seems to be policy ineffectiveness in this regard. This may be explained by the conflicting interests between the masses and the government (particularly those government officials whose main aim is to make policies that fit their individual benefits). For instance, the sale of petroleum products generates more income or revenue to the government in Nigeria than any other source. Statistics show that the oil and gas sector accounts for at least ninety-five (95) per cent of Nigeria’s earnings in foreign exchange and services at least eighty (80) of Nigeria’s budgetary needs.[27] However, policies of government are geared towards the satisfaction of the few in government than on the overall well-being of the majority-the masses.[28] This presents a serious problem to energy security. Abdulsalam and others describe this using the elite theory thus:
The issue of energy security in Nigeria can be best explained by the elite theory, which describes the influence of a minority group over economic and public policies. The theory recognizes the power imbalance between the elites, who have greater control and decision-making power, and the majority who have less power.[29]
The elite theory in relation to energy security extends to the likelihood of corruption of government officials and affects Nigeria in multiple dimensions. This includes decision making in energy resources contrary to public benefits and encouraging policies against energy security. Abdallah and Odeleke[30] sums this up when they stated that:
Petrol, Nigeria’s most controversial energy resource, is also marred by inefficiencies and corruption. The security of petrol as a resource is in the hands of a small group of elites who make decisions regarding its distribution in their own interests, rather than the interests of the general public. The natural gas sector has similarly been affected by availability and affordability issues that discourage average citizens from demanding Liquefied Natural Gas. Kerosene supply has been controlled by major middlemen and unlicensed personnel in the petroleum sector, resulting in increased prices for consumers. Other challenges include corruption tendencies that hinder the implementation of effective policies, insecurity, and external forces.[31]
AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF ENERGY RESOURCES
It has been stated earlier that energy security encompasses the continuous availability and affordability of energy resources. Where the twin pillars of energy security are in existence or remain uninterrupted, then development and sustainability follow. Where one or more is lacking or inadequate however, there is bound to be insecurity. Under this heading, our main concern is the uninterrupted affordability of energy. Even though Nigeria has oil and gas for instance in abundance, the cost of obtaining this energy resource is beyond the reach of many households. This is why Akabuiro and Umeobika[32] believe that the energy insecurity suffered by Nigeria and Nigerians is unnecessary given the abundance of energy resources within the country’s territory. The authors maintain that this trend continuously affect the welfare of citizens just as it affects the economy.[33]
OIL THEFT AND PIPELINE VANDALISM
It was reported in 2022 that Nigeria had lost at least $1 billion in the first quarter of that year.[34] In July 2023, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution which sought to investigate the theft of crude oil in Nigeria[35]. The figures which necessitated the investigation were staggering. Honourable Philip Agbese who moved the motion noted that around forty percent of loss of crude oil is attributed to theft and that the country lost $4 billion due to the same reason. In the preceding twelve years, Agbese noted that based on the Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative Report, Nigeria had lost $46.16 billion due to theft of crude oil.
One of the mediums of crude oil theft is Pipeline vandalism. Pipeline vandalism refers to any unauthorised activity on oil pipelines which seek to tamper with and/or destroy the pipelines in order that the perpetrators may derive crude oil for personal use or commercial purposes[36]. 2787 breaks due to vandalism were reported in Nigeria between 2010 and 2012 alone[37]. It has been posited that crude oil theft and pipeline vandalism are direct effects of the continuous exploitation and other actions of the elite against the masses, particularly the oil producing communities and workers in the oil sector.[38] This coincides with the elite theory described above. Thus, as the elite continue to exert their influence on the masses and deprive them of their entitlements, they (the masses) who are overstretched tend to retaliate by taking matters into their hands, in this case, steal the energy resources they have been deprived of. This is aimed at changing the order prescribed by the elite. According to Ake[39],
Those who are economically privileged tend to be interested in preserving the existing social order, and those who are disadvantaged by the social order, particularly its distribution of wealth, have a strong interest in changing the social order. A society where a high degree of economic inequality exists must necessarily be repressive. The repression arises from the need to curb the inevitable demand of the have-nots for redistribution. We see here economic conditions not only setting the tone of politics but also defining the role of coercion in society.
While crude oil theft is said to be both a crime and a moral wrong, Ake’s position above indicate that the act of theft may be justified by the existing economic realities. In other words, ‘we forget that theft as a moral value is something created and dependent on a particular economic condition. Where there is no scarcity and no private property, the idea of theft will not arise’.[40]
It follows that the answer to crude oil theft lies more in the economic condition than in abstract rules. Thus, the solution to crude oil theft lies more in the elite ensuring energy security than criminalising theft. This research suggests later on that this may be done through the adoption and good use of modular refineries. Anyio posits that in the absence of energy security or a consideration of the economic condition of the masses, nothing else will work. Crude oil theft will continue or even get worse.[41]
MILITANCY AND ILLEGAL REFINING
Militancy and Illegal oil refining are among the major threats to energy security in Nigeria. The militants gained prominence from 2004 when they targeted oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta region. These groups which were usually youths within the oil producing communities destroyed oil pipelines, kidnapped expatriates who were working in oil companies in the Niger Delta to draw the governments’ attention towards the continued neglect of the local communities.[42] This very much resonates with the need to be people centred in the formulation of policies and practices in the energy sector to ensure energy security as discussed above.
ABSENCE OF/ LOW FUNCTIONING OF LOCAL REFINERIES
Shell-BP established the first local refinery in Nigeria in 1965. The refinery which was in Portharcourt started with an initial production capacity of thirty-eight (38, 000) barrels per day and was subsequently upgraded to sixty thousand (60, 000).[43] At first, this refinery met the domestic needs of energy in Nigeria. However, as the population plummeted there was need for more to be done. Thus, three more refineries were brought into operation in 1978, 1983 and 1989 bringing the combined production capacity to 445000 barrels per day.[44] From 1990, even these four refineries could not cater for the energy needs of Nigeria. It was not only because the production capacity of 445000 was less than the consumption rate. The production rate itself had dropped due to several factors. According to Olaniyi:
Beginning of 1990, the unexpected began to happen, the four domestic refineries combined capacities was no longer sustainable as they could not perform to their optimum. This was as a result, government interference, inadequate maintenances resulting in less capacity utilization, poor funding among many others. Unfortunately, this trend has persisted ever since despite all frantic efforts and budgets earmarked for turnaround maintenances, rather than getting better, performance has been on the downhill direction. In fact, the combined capacity utilization dropped to 6.1% in September, 2017 which represents a continuous drop from the average 13.7% in 2018…In contrast to the contemporary, the domestic refineries are considered to have so much aged due to irregular maintenance and recently, statistics show production at a paltry level of 30% combined capacity equivalent to about 1.6 billion liters of petroleum motor spirit (PMS), a lot less compared to an estimated 18.8 billion liters of PMS per annum required to meet the domestic demand in 2017. Apart from ageing, the continued decline in production capacity, among other, is what has led to introduction of modular refineries by the Federal government as part of the transformational agenda to exit the country from over dependence on imported refined fuels and to become selfsufficient and ultimately a net exporter.[45]
From all the above, it is evident that the lack of functioning refineries in Nigeria results in acute shortage of energy resources in their finished state. This in turn gives rise to financial and other costs due to importation. The end result is that there is lack of availability, affordability and accessibility of energy resources – resources which are necessary for Nigeria’s energy security.
THE LEGAL IMPACT OF OIL SUBSIDY REMOVAL ON ENERGY SECURITY
It is seen earlier that over the years, oil subsidy has been removed at various times during the regimes of Babangida, Abacha, Obasanjo and Jonathan with a view to using the monies generated therefrom to fund other critical development initiatives.[46] Obasanjo’s regime for instance insisted that it is not the removal of oil subsidies that causes energy insecurity and other related problems such as poverty but rather the ineffective use of the funds generated from such removal.[47] Thus, his regime was committed to remedying this problem by using the funds for critical infrastructural development and other initiatives – hospitals, education, roads, portable water, etc.[48] It has however been submitted that none of the regimes achieved their stated objectives for the removal of oil subsidy and so at the moment no justification for such removal has been made. Lawal puts it in the following words:
Yet, the objectives of government had not been achieved. Scarcity of fuel had been persistent, resulting in long queues, wasted man-hours on queues, fuel adulteration resulting in fire incidences and the consequent loss of lives, loss of production facilities and loss of production arising from increased cost of infrastructural facilities. In spite of all these, investment in the downstream had not been stimulated. The local refineries had virtually been out of production. Poverty had increased among the people.
In the present dispensation, after removing oil subsidy in May 2023, it was reported in July of the same year that the Tinubu’s administration saved about $1.32 billion after less than three months of removing oil subsidy.[49] Research has not shown further savings or the use which the monies derived from oil subsidy removal have been put to. The removal of oil subsidy has had serious negative effect on the economy and the general population.
Many of the challenges of energy security discussed above have worsened as a result of the removal of oil subsidy.[50] The President has therefore turned to dolling out palliatives in order to reduce the hardship caused by oil subsidy removal.[51] While the subsidy removal and the palliatives have been said to have failed to positively impact energy security and the hardship faced by the public, it is similarly opined that Nigeria may, in the end, spend more on palliatives than what it might save from oil subsidy removal.[52]
In the final analysis, it has become evident that removal of oil subsidy in Nigeria has always failed to result into any positive outcome. In fact, it has been said that the removal of oil subsidy in Nigeria under President Tinubu has worsened the existing energy security challenges.[53] This is perhaps why an author has stated that at the moment oil subsidy is the most important ‘energy security’ item which Nigeria cannot do without.[54] One reason for this may be the policy deficiency discussed earlier in this work. Just as in 1986, the government had not considered the real issues such as corruption, absence of local refineries, the incessant crises, among others in order to address them before removing oil subsidy. The effect has been that more than the regime of oil subsidy, energy insecurity has heightened. Oil products are not available and neither are they affordable and accessible. The implication is that it is now more difficult for the government to respond to the challenges of energy insecurity that it was before the removal.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The above indicates that oil subsidy removal have tremendous negative effects on energy security in Nigeria. It is observed that over the years, the periods of oil subsidy removal have witnessed greater public challenges of energy security than the periods of embracing oil subsidy. This is largely because the needed consideration has not been given to the foundation to be put in place before the removal of oil subsidy. As a result, each removal is done arbitrarily leading to devastating energy security issues as well as undermining the general wellbeing of the people. It is therefore recommended the oil subsidy removal regime should be reversed and the following firmly put in place before removing oil subsidy;
- Nigeria should set up and sustain its local refining capacity. This will reduce the amount of expenditure that arises from importation of refined oil.
- A policy of accountability should be entrenched to ensure judicious use of funds for infrastructural and human capital development. This will lead to the creation of jobs, better and affordable healthcare, ease of doing business, etc, in such a manner that Nigerians can have what it takes to afford oil.
- Even with the above, the subsidy removal should be a gradual process. This will reduce the counter productive effect of subsidy removal over the years.
[1] Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th edn, Thomson Reuters 2014) 1656.
[2] Jessica Jewell and others, ‘Supplementary Information for Limited Emission Reductions from Fuel Subsidy Removal except in Energy Exporting Regions’ (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 2018). <https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/15086/2/SI%20Subsidies%20paper%20180115.pdf> accessed 23 May 2025.
[3] Maria Chinecherem Uzonwanne, Regina Uju Ezenekwe & Paul Chinenye Iregbenu, ‘Fuel Subsidy Removal and the Nigerian Economy’ [2015] 5(4) Australian Journal of Business and Management Research 15.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Yekini Olawaiye Lawal, ‘Subsidy Removal or Deregulation: Investment Challenge in Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry’ (2014) American Journal of Social and Management Sciences https://doi.org/10.5251/ajsms.2014.5.1.1.10 accessed 23 May 2025.
[6] Stephen Onyeiwu, ‘Fuel subsidies in Nigeria: they’re bad for the economy, but the lifeblood of politicians’ (The Conversation 4 November 2021) <https://theconversation.com/fuel-subsidies-in-nigeria-theyre-bad-for-the-economy-but-the-lifeblood-of-politicians-170966> accessed 23 May 2025.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Johnny Okongwu & Simon Ejokema Imoisi, ‘Removal of Petrol Subsidy: Legal Implications for the Nigerian Economy’ [2022] 13 (2) Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence 135.
[9] Onyeiwu (n 6).
[10] Danladi Abah & Peter Wilfred Naankiel, ‘Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria and its Implication on Socio-Economic Development, 1980-1995’ [2016] 6 (2) Calabar Historical Journal <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318755508_Structural_Adjustment_Programme_in_Nigeria_and_its_Implications_on_Socio-Economic_Development_1980-1995> accessed 23 May 2025.
[11] World Bank Group, ‘Nigeria – Structural Adjustment Program: Policies, Implementation, and Impact’ (1 July 2010) <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/959091468775569769/Nigeria-Structural-adjustment-program-policies-implementation-and-impact> accessed 23 May 2025.
[12] Ibid
[13] Ibid
[14] Onyeiwu (n 6).
[15] Danladi Bashir, ‘The Economic Implication of Fuel Subsidy Removal in Nigeria’ [2016] 2(4) International Journal of Business and Administrative Studies 103.
[16] Mahmud Kayode Adebayo, ‘The Politics of Removal of Petroleum Subsidy, National Security and Legal Issues’ [2018] 4(1) KIU Journal of Social Sciences 31.
[17] Fubara Susan Amiesa, Omowumi Iledare and Onyije Israel, ‘Assessing the Economic Implication of Energy Insecurity in Nigeria’ <https://www.iaee.org/en/publications/proceedingsabstractpdf.aspx?id=14320> accessed 23 May 2025.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Dominic Obilor Akabuiro and Chinazor Queen Umeobika, ‘Energy Security and Energy Related Offences in Nigeria: The Challenges of Enforcement’ [2020] 4(2) AJLHR 181.
[21] Sunday Olayinka Oyedepo, ‘Energy and Sustainable Development in Nigeria: The Way Forward [2012] 2(15) Energy, Sustainability and Society 1 https://doi.org/10.1186/2192-0567-2-15 accessed 23 May 2025.
[22] Akabuiro & Umeobika, (n 20) 183.
[23] See section 44 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999
[24] Section 3 of the Petroleum Industry Act 2021.
[25] Ibikunle Olalekan Ogundari, ‘Modular Refinery Critical Infrastructure Investment in Nigeria: A Strategic Project Planning Assessment’ [2021] 2(1&2) African Journal of Science Policy and Innovation Management 21.
[26] Ibid 22.
[27] Global Edge ‘Nigeria: Economy’ <https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/nigeria/economy> accessed 6 June 2025; Statista, ‘Contribution of oil and natural gas sector to GDP in Nigeria from 4th Quarter of 2018 to the 2nd Quarter of 2023’(2023) <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1165865/contribution-of-oil-sector-to-gdp-in-nigeria/> accessed 6 June 2025.
[28] Ahmad Abdulsalam Abdallah and Odetokun Blessing Odeleke, ‘Energy Security in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects’ [2023] 1(1) Journal of Arid Zone Economy 101, 102.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Abdallah & Odeleke (n 28) 107.
[31] Ibid
[32] Akabuiro & Umeobika, (n 20) 183.
[33] Ibid
[34] Camillus Eboh, ‘Nigeria lost $1 in Q1 revenue to crude oil theft’ (Reuters, 2 July 2022) <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-lost-1-billion-q1-revenue-crude-oil-theft-2022-07-02/> accessed 6 June 2025.
[35] Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre, ‘House of Representatives Investigates Crude Oil Theft in the Oil and Gas Sector (PLAC 5 September 2023) <https://placng.org/Legist/house-of-representatives-investigates-crude-oil-theft-in-the-oil-gas-sector/> accessed 6 June 2025.
[36] Akabuiro & Umeobika, (n 20) 185.
[37] Mmeje David Uchechukwu, Bello Ayuba and UD Mohammed, ‘Investigation of Pipeline Vandalism and its Implications on Business Activities in Nigeria’ (2017) 38 Journal of Resources Development and Management 69, 71.
[38] Silas Felix Anyio, ‘Illegal Oil Bunkering and Oil Theft in Nigeria: Impact on the National Economy and the Way Forward’ [2015] 1(1) ILIMI Journal of Arts and Social Sciences 53, 54.
[39] Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Longman 1981).
[40] M Watts, ‘Crude Politics: Life and Death on the Nigerian Oil Fields’ Niger Delta Economics of Violence, Working Papers No. 25 cited in Omoyibo Kingsley Ufuoma, Political Economy Diagnosis of Crude Oil Theft in Nigeria: The Way Forward [2014] 5(2) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences https://doi.org/105901/mjss.2014.v5n2p297 accessed 6 June 2025.
[41] Anyio (n 38) 57.
[42] SDN, ‘A Brief Overview of Some of the Historical Events Leading up to Past Conflict and Present Day Insecurity in the Niger Delta Today’ < https://www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/the-niger-delta/niger-delta-history/> accessed 6 June 2025.
[43] Olatona Temitope Olaniyi, ‘Developing Modular Refineries in the Downstream Sub-Sector of the Nigerian Petroleum Industry’ [2022] 11 (3) International Journal of Engineering Research & Technology 244.
[44] Ibid
[45] Olaniyi (n 43) 244 – 245.
[46] Lawal (n 5).
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Felix Onuah, ‘Nigeria’s Tinubu says scrapping fuel subsidy has saved $1.32 billion’ (Reuters 31 July 2023) <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-saved-132-bln-two-months-after-fuel-subsidy-removal-tinubu-2023-07-31/> accessed 6 June 2025.
[50] Tobore Jerome, ‘Tinubu: Between subsidy removal and palliatives’ (The Nigerian Observer 20 July 2024) <https://nigerianobservernews.com/2024/07/tinubu-between-subsidy-removal-and-palliatives/?amp> accessed 6 June 2025.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Audu Liberty Oseni, ‘Fuel Subsidy: Energy Security Nigeria Can’t do Without’ <https://mawafd.org/2023/09/24/fuel-subsidy-energy-security-nigeria-cant-do-without/> accessed 6 June 2025.
[54] Ibid.